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INTRODUCTION
No aspect of constitutional law has been dominated more by
"originalism" than First Amendment Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence.' Although not every decision and not every approach invokes
the Founding Fathers,2 their presence in modern church-state court
opinions is unparalleled.3  Yet despite repeated appeals to James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, both the original intention and the
contemporary meaning of the Establishment Clause remain sharply
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For a recent history of"originalism" that notes the importance of the First Amendment in
its development, see JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 86-90, 151-52 (2005) (discussing how the mid-twentieth century
First Amendment cases resulted in a greater focus on originalism).
2 For examples of Establishment Clause jurisprudence that do not rely on originalist intent,
see Justice Kennedy's "Coercion" test in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-88 (1992), Justice
O'Connor's "Endorsement" test in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
688, 690 (1984), and justice Burger's "Lemon" test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971).
3 According to Donald L. Drakeman, approximately 100 federal and state court decisions
have highlighted James Madison's role in crafting the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
Donald L. Drakeman, James Madison and the First Amendment Establishment of Religion Clause, in
RELIGION AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN JEFFERSON'S VIRGINIA 219, 219 (Garrett Ward Sheldon &
Daniel L. Dreisbach eds., 2000). Even Justice William Brennan, no champion of "originalism,"
claimed that in the context of prayer in public schools, "the line we must draw between the
permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the
understanding of the Founding Fathers." Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring). In the same case, however, Justice Brennan also stated that he
"doubt[ed] that [Madison and Jefferson's] view, even if perfectly clear one way or the other,
would supply a dispositive answer to the question presented by these cases" and that "[a] too
literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers ... seems to me futile and misdirected." Id.
at 236-37.
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contested.4 Among contemporary scholars and jurists, in fact, less
agreement exists now about the Establishment Clause's original
meaning than when the Supreme Court first attempted to decide the
matter in Everson v. Board of Education.' The more historical research
devoted to the subject, it seems, the more contentious the debate be-
comes.
Not only has the debate continued, it has become increasingly
complicated. In the 2004 Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow
case, Justice Clarence Thomas advanced a federalist construction of
the Establishment Clause,6 a position he reasserted in the 2005 Ten
Commandments case Van Orden v. Perry. According to Justice Tho-
mas, "the Establishment Clause is best understood as a federalism
provision-it protects state establishments from federal interference
but does not protect any individual right."8  In Newdow, Thomas im-
plicitly rejected his earlier "non-preferentialist" interpretation, 9 an
approach that he had shared with Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
In the 1985 case Wallace v. Jaffree, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued that the Framers intended to allow governmental support of re-
ligion as long as the state did not prefer one sect over others.' °
Rehnquist's "non-preferentialist" construction itself was challenged
on originalism grounds by Justice David Souter, who championed a
4 For a discussion of Jefferson's and Madison's roles in the Supreme Court's religion juris-
prudence, see David Reiss, Jefferson and Madison as Icons in Judicial History: A Study of Religion
ClauseJurisprudence, 61 MD. L. REV. 94 (2002).
5 330 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1947) (summarizing the history of and purpose behind the First Amend-
ment's enactment); see also infta Part I.A for a discussion of Everson v. Board of Education.
6 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) ("I would take this opportunity to begin the process of rethinking the Establishment
Clause. I would acknowledge that the Establishment Clause is a federalism provision, which, for
this reason, resists incorporation.").
7 See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2865 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("1 have
previously suggested that the Clause's text and history 'resis[t] incorporation' against the States.
If the Establishment Clause does not restrain the States, then it has no application here, where
only state action is at issue." (citation omitted)).
8 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 50 (Thomas, J., concurring). It should be noted that Justice Thomas
had suggested this position in passing in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris stating: "The Establishment
Clause originally protected States, and by extension their citizens, from the imposition of an
established religion by the Federal Government." 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas,J., concur-
ring).
9 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861-63 (1995) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Establishment Clause does not "compel the exclusion of
religious groups from government benefits programs that are generally available to a broad
class of participants" but rather permits the participation of religious entities in neutral, even-
handed programs).
10 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Clause was
also designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious
denomination or sect over others. Given the 'incorporation' of the Establishment Clause as
against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment..., States are prohibited as well from estab-
lishing a religion or discriminating between sects.").
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"strict-separationist" interpretation in Lee v. Weisman, the 1992 public-
school graduation prayer case." Souter argued that the "Framers
meant the Establishment Clause's prohibition to encompass non-
preferential aid to religion,' 2 an interpretation he further developed
threelrears later in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Vir-
ginia.
At least the three competing accounts of the original meaning of
the Establishment Clause inform church-state jurisprudence. More
than fifty years after the. Supreme Court first turned to the Framers to
interpret the Establishment Clause, the Court remains divided over
what the Framers actually meant. One might have expected that a
half-century of legal scholarship and constitutional development
would have clarified the historical record, but the opposite seems to
have occurred. This failure of scholarship and jurisprudence may
help explain why the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
remains, asJustice Thomas once described it, "in hopeless disarray."
4
What, then, are we to make of the original meaning of the Estab-
lishment Clause? Is that meaning, as some scholars claim, impossible
to decipher? 5 Is Justice Thomas's attention to federalism historically
1 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-16 (1992) (SouterJ., concurring) ("[H]istory neither
contradicts nor warrants reconsideration of the settled principle that the Establishment Clause
forbids support for religion in general no less than support for one religion or some.").
12 Id. at 613.
13 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 868-74 (SouterJ., dissenting).
14 Id. at 861 (Thomas,J, concurring).
15 See, e.g., Daan Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 45
MD. L. REV. 352, 375 (1986) (arguing that the "historical evidence ... does not provide many
answers, and ... a literal quest for the Framers' intent may be both futile and misdirected");
William P. Marshall, Unprecedential Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 930-
31 (1986) (arguing that the historical record is ambiguous in regard to whether the Establish-
ment Clause was intended to allow accommodation of religion or require strict separation be-
tween church and state); Mark Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33
LoY. L. REV. 221, 229 (1987) ("[D]ifficulties with originalist theories of the establishment clause
simply exemplify the general problem of originalism, which is that social change makes it a the-
ory of constitutional interpretation that regularly fails to provide guidance on matters of con-
temporary constitutional controversy because it disregards the complexities of both the histori-
cal record and the current situation."); see also DANIEL 0. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
RELIGION CLAUSES 26 (2003) (claiming that "the original understanding is an overrated source
of constitutional values in this area [(religious establishment)]"); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual
Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 417 (2002) (asserting that "an accurate
account of the intellectual origins of the Establishment Clause does not, and cannot, provide a
definitive answer to the question of what exactly the Establishment Clause prohibited then or
prohibits now"); Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Relig-
ion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 129 (1990) ("At most,
Rehnquist's originalist arguments prove that history provides support for two alternative tradi-
tions concerning the role of religion in our political culture .... Although history helps to de-
fine the choices between these alternative traditions, it cannot make this choice for us."); Frank
Guliuzza III, The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based Judicial Philosophy: Originalism and the
Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 343, 372 (1993) (noting originalism's failure to resolve
historical contradictions when it comes to the adoption of the religion clauses).
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accurate? Is Justice Rehnquist's "non-preferential" approach or Jus-
tice Souter's "strict-separationist" interpretation correct? This Article
addresses these questions by reexamining the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause. Part I reviews the leading "originalist" inter-
pretations that have been set forth by members of the Supreme
Court. Part II begins my attempt to recover the original meaning of
the Establishment Clause through an investigation of the historical
and political context in which the Establishment Clause emerged.
6
Part III offers a detailed analysis of the drafting of the clause in light
of the historical and political contexts described in Part II. I con-
clude thatJustice Thomas's federalism interpretation most accurately
captures the Establishment Clause's original meaning. In his Newdow
opinion, however, Justice Thomas failed to consider the implications
of his federalist construction. Part IV focuses on those implications,
concluding that the Founders' original concern with federalism nec-
essarily means that the original meaning that animated the adoption
of the Establishment Clause cannot be applied to modern day incor-
porated "no-establishment" jurisprudence.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S QUEST FOR THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Building of the "Strict-Separationist" Wall: Everson v.
Board of Education
Historical scholarship on the original meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause remains influenced by Everson, the Supreme Court's first
modern Establishment Clause case. In Everson, the Court upheld, 5-
4, a local NewJersey school district policy that reimbursed transporta-
tion costs incurred by parents of children attending parochial
schools. 7 Everson's lasting impact lies not in its result, however, but in
Justice Hugo Black's majority opinion and Justice Wiley Rutledge's
dissent, both of which invoked the Founders to interpret the Estab-
lishment Clause as requiring the "strict separation" of church and
state.
Justice Black's opinion presents the adoption of the Establishment
Clause as the result of the revolutionary movement for religious free-
16 This Article attempts to uncover the "original meaning" of the Establishment Clause con-
sistent with what Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen call "original public meaning tex-
tualism." It should be noted, however, that the Establishment Clause's "original meaning" is
consistent with the phrases "original intention" and its "original understanding." For a discus-
sion of the different types of originalism, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The In-
terpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003).
17 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1947).
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dom that "reached its dramatic climax in Virginia in 1785-86, ".8 when
the Virginia Assembly, led by James Madison, adopted Thomas Jeffer-
son's "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty."' 9 Justice Black turned to
1785-86 Virginia, and not the First Federal Congress, because " [t] his
Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First
Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison andJef-
ferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and were in-
tended to provide the same protection against governmental intru-
sion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute.""
Given the central importance of the Virginia Statute to his inter-
pretation, Justice Black, surprisingly, failed to offer any direct exege-
sis of the text of Jefferson's bill. Instead, he treated Jefferson's and
Madison's thoughts as self-explanatory, presenting only an extended
quotation from Jefferson's bill 2' and a one-sentence summary of
is Id. at 11.
19 Id. at 12.
20 Id. at 13. Justice Black offered only the following citations to substantiate his assertion
that the Court previously recognized that the First Amendment had the same objective and was
intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as
the Virginia Statute: Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). Id. CheckingJustice Black's
references does not support his assertion. In Reynolds, the landmark Mormon polygamy case,
the Court suggested that "[t]he controversy upon this general subject [of religious establish-
ment] ... seemed at last to culminate in Virginia" and the passing of Jefferson's Virginia Stat-
ute. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163. However, the opinion then suggested thatJefferson's letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association-not the Virginia Statute-"may be accepted almost as an authori-
tative declaration of the scope and effect of the [First] [A]mendment." Id. at 164. Watson v.
Jones lacks a single reference to the Virginia Statute; it is unclear why Justice Black cites it.
Checking Justice Black's citation to Davis v. Beason, similarly, fails to reveal a reference to the
Virginia Statute or its relationship to the First Amendment. Justice Field's majority opinion in
the case quoted Justice Waite's opinion in Reynolds at length, but it fails to refer to Jefferson's
Virginia Statute. Davis, 133 U.S. at 343-44 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66). However, in
the free exercise case Jones v. Opelika, Justice Murphy, in dissent, wrote that "[a] n arresting par-
allel exists between the troubles of Jehovah's Witnesses and the struggles of various dissentient
groups in the American colonies for religious liberty which culminated in the Virginia Statute
for Religious Freedom, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and the First Amendment." 316 U.S.
584, 622 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Why Justice Black failed to cite Jones v. Opelika is un-
clear. A previous Court opinion thus had mentioned the Virginia Statute, but did not claim
that the First Amendment had "the same objective" as the Virginia Statute. The references to
the Virginia Statute, moreover, occurred in the context of interpreting the Free Exercise
Clause, not the Establishment Clause. Justice Black thus failed to substantiate his assertion that
the Court had previously recognized that the original meaning of the Establishment Clause had
the same objective asJefferson's Virginia Statute.
21 Justice Black cites the following from Jefferson's Virginia Statute:
Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by tem-
poral punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of
hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our re-
ligion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coer-
cions on either . .. ; that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forc-
ing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him
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Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance."22 From these citations,
Black derived his sweeping interpretation of the Establishment
Clause:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a per-
son to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be pun-
ished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against es-
tablishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation
between church and State." 2
Despite this expansive separationist reading, Justice Black concluded
that the First Amendment was not violated by the school district's pol-
icy of refunding the transportation costs of children attending Catho-
lic schools.
2 4
In his dissent, Justice Rutledge agreed that the Founding Fathers
intended the Establishment Clause to enact a "wall of separation" be-
tween church and state, and, for that reason, he concluded the
school district's policy violated the Constitution.25 Rutledge's opinion
of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose
morals he would make his pattern ....
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his
body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or be-
lief....
Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-13 (citation omitted).
22 Justice Black noted:
In ["Memorial and Remonstrance"], [Madison] eloquently argued that a true religion
did not need the support of law; that no person, either believer or non-believer, should
be taxed to support a religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of a society
required that the minds of men always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions were
the inevitable result of government-established religions.
Id. at 12.
23 Id. at 15-16.
24 Id. at 17 ("Measured by these standards, we cannot say that the First Amendment prohib-
its NewJersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a
part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other
schools.").
25 Id. at 56-57 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see aLso id. at 19 (ackson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising separation of Church
from State, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their commingling in
educational matters.").
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begins with the seemingly awkwardly phrased text, "respecting an es-
tablishment. 2 6 The Framers, Justice Rutledge explained, meant that
"[n] ot simply an established church, but any law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion is forbidden. ''27  As interpreted by Justice
Rutledge, "respecting an" means "tending toward"-that is, the
Founders not only intended to prohibit a traditional establishment
like the Church of England, they also sought to prohibit anything
tending toward such an arrangement. Interpreted this way, "respect-
ing an" expands the prohibition against religious establishments. Jus-
tice Rutledge thus concluded that the Framers meant "to create a
complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activ-
ity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of
public aid or support for religion.
2'8
To support this reading, Justice Rutledge turned to the "generat-
ing history" of the religion clauses, which he claims includes the pro-
ceedings of the First Congress and "also the long and intensive strug-
gle for religious freedom in America, more especially in Virginia, of
which the [First] Amendment was the direct culmination., 29 Whereas
Justice Black emphasized Jefferson's Virginia Statute and his "wall of
separation" letter to the Danbury Baptists, Justice Rutledge focused
upon James Madison and his "Memorial and Remonstrance." The
"Memorial," he explained, is "the most concise and the most accurate
statement of the views of the First Amendment's author concerning
what is 'an establishment of religion.' '3 0 Madison's views take prece-
dence above all others, moreover, because "[h]e epitomized the
whole of that tradition in the [First] Amendment's compact, but
nonetheless comprehensive, phrasing.
3 1
As interpreted by Justice Rutledge, Madison advanced a categori-
cal separation between church and state: "With Jefferson, Madison
believed that to tolerate any fragment of establishment would be by
so much to perpetuate restraint upon that [religious] freedom.
Hence he sought to tear out the institution not partially but root and
branch, and to bar its return forever."3 2 The "Memorial" contains "a
broadside attack upon all forms of 'establishment' of religion, both
general and particular, nondiscriminatory or selective. 3  Madison
was "unrelentingly absolute... in opposing state support or aid [to
26 Id. at 28 (Rutledge,J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 31.
28 Id. at 31-32. This interpretation of "respecting" was subsequently instrumental to Chief
Justice Burger's majority opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
29 Everson, 330 U.S. at 33-34 (Rutledge,J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 37.
31 Id. at 39.
32 Id. at 40.
23 Id. at 37.
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religion] by taxation. Not even 'three pence' contribution was thus
to be exacted from any citizen for such a purpose.' In short, "Madi-
son opposed every form and degree of official relation between relig-
ion and civil authority.
'
0
5
Justice Rutledge did pause to consider the debates in the First
Congress surrounding the drafting of the First Amendment. But
these debates, he found, "reveal only sparse discussion. ''s6 The First
Congress had little to debate because "the essential issues had been
settled. Indeed, the matter had become so well understood as to
have been taken for granted in all but formal phrasing. 3 ' The First
Congress was little more than a mark-up session, Justice Rutledge
suggested, because the Founders had adopted Madison's absolute
separation principle as articulated in the "Memorial and Remon-
strance."
B. The "Non-Preferentialist "--"Strict-Separationist" Debate: Wallace v.
Jaffree, Lee v. Weisman, and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
University of Virginia
After Everson, various Justices sprinkled references to the Found-
ing Fathers in their Establishment Clause opinions.3' No single opin-
ion, however, contained anything like Everson's historical analysis un-
til then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist's fiery dissent in Wallace
v. Jaffree.3 9  Armed with then-recent scholarship, Justice Rehnquist
launched a full-scale assault on Everson's historical accuracy and the
"wall of separation" interpretation built upon it. His strategy was not
to reveal Everson's inaccuracies point-by-point, but rather to show that
34 Id. at 40.
35 Id. at 39.
36 Id. at 42.
57 Id.
38 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 233-35 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(discussing the Framers' purpose in enacting the Establishment Clause and noting that the
Clause was intended "to assure that the national legislature would not exert its power in the ser-
vice of any purely religious end; that it would not.., make of religion, as religion, an object of
legislation"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446-47 n.3 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing the historical tradition, beginning with the Founders, among all three branches of govern-
ment to use prayer in opening sessions and in assumption of office); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Jef-
ferson's metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State speaks of a 'wall of
separation,' not of a fine line easily overstepped."); Id. at 244-48 (Reed, J., dissenting) (deter-
mining that the Illinois school district did not violate the Establishment Clause when it permit-
ted religious instructions to be given in public school buildings through relying on Jefferson's
annual report to the University of Virginia authorizing religious education at public universities
and rejecting the applicability of Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance").
39 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
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Justices Black and Rutledge looked in the wrong place to find the Es-
tablishment Clause's original meaning.
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion began by dismissing the
relevance of Jefferson and questioning the applicability of statements
made by Madison as a Virginia state legislator. 0 Justice Black asserted
that Jefferson played a "leading" role in the drafting and adoption of
the First Amendment;41 but Jefferson, Rehnquist pointed out, was in
France at the time and was not involved in the drafting or adoption
of the First Amendment. 42 Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists-
from which the phrase "the wall of separation" comes-was written
fourteen years after Congress passed the Bill of Rights. 43  Madison,
Justice Rehnquist admitted, composed the first draft of what would
become the Bill of Rights and shepherded the proposed amendments
through the First Congress." However, the Madison who secured the
passage of the First Amendment, according to Justice Rehnquist, was
not the same Madison who led the battle for religious freedom inVirginia. In the First Congress, Madison spoke "as an advocate of
sensible legislative compromise, not as an advocate of incorporating
the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty into the United States Con-
stitution."' 6  Madison's original proposed text-"nor shall any na-
tional religion be established"-and his subsequent modifications
and comments in the House debates-that the proposed language
"no religion shall be established by law" should be amended by insert-
ing the word "national" in front of the word "religion"-reveal, ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, "that [Madison] saw the Amendment as
designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and
perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects." 7 Madison may have
defended and defined the "wall of separation" in Virginia (Justice
Rehnquist did not comment on the matter), but those statements are
irrelevant to interpreting the meaning of the First Amendment.
40 Id. at 92-94 ("It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken un-
derstanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been ex-
pressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years.... [W] hen we turn
to the record of the First Congress. . . , including Madison's significant contributions thereto,
we see a far different picture than the highly simplified 'wall of separation' .....
41 Everson, 330 U.S. at 13.
42 Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See id. at 93-94 ("Madison's subsequent remarks in urging the House to adopt his drafts of
the proposed amendments were less those of a dedicated advocate to the wisdom of such meas-
ures than those of a prudent statesman seeking the enactment of measures sought by a number
of his fellow citizens which could surely do no harm and might do a great deal of good.").
46 Id. at 98.
47 Id.
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Justice Rehnquist failed to make the point explicitly, but his opin-
ion contains a methodological assumption fundamental to his argu-
ment. To grasp the meaning of the First Amendment, he assumed
that one must look to the intentions of those who drafted it within
the context of its actual adoption. Only the debate over the text of
the amendment in the First Congress is relevant, then, not the estab-
lishment of religious freedom in Virginia. In this way, Justice
Rehnquist made Madison's statements as a Virginia state legislator-
including the "Memorial and Remonstrance"-inapposite to deter-
mine the Establishment Clause's original meaning. He concluded,
accordingly, that Everson was based "upon a mistaken understanding
of constitutional history. ' 4" The Court made a jurisprudential error
when it derived the meaning of the First Amendment from the Vir-
ginia debates on religious freedom. "[N] othing in the Establishment
Clause," Justice Rehnquist asserted, "requires government to be
strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause
prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends
through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.
To reinforce the point, Justice Rehnquist presented various ex-
amples of the ways that the Founding Fathers' public policy explicitly
favored religion. The First Federal Congress-the same body that
drafted the First Amendment-passed the Northwest Ordinance,
which stated that "[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being neces-
sary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and
the means of education shall forever be encouraged.- 50 Presidents
Washington, Adams, and Madison issued official proclamations de-
claring official days of prayer and thanksgiving. 5 President Jefferson,
who thought such proclamations were unconstitutional, signed a
treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians that provided annual cash support
for the Tribe's Roman Catholic priest and church . Justice
Rehnquist resoundingly declared that "[t] here is simply no historical
foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build
the 'wall of separation' that was constitutionalized in Everson.,
53
Justice Rehnquist's Jaffree dissent, which itself largely followed his-
torian Robert Cord's work,54 launched a wave of historical scholarship
on the Founders and religious liberty. Some of the work most critical
48 Id. at 92.
49 Id. at 113.
50 Id. at 100 (quoting the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789)).
51 Id. at 103.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 106.
54 Justice Rehnquist cites Robert L. Cord only once in his opinion (id. at 104) but his entire
opinion seems to closely follow Cord's argument in SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
HISTORICAL REALITY AND CURRENT FICTION (1982).
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of Rehnquist would be utilized by then-newly appointed Justice David
Souter in the public-school graduation prayer case, Lee v. Weisman.
Weisman involved the constitutionality of a non-denominational
prayer composed and recited by a rabbi at a public middle school• 6
graduation. Concurring with the Court's decision to strike down
the prayer, Justice Souter approached the Establishment Clause
much in the same manner as Justice Rehnquist, focusing on the in-
tentions of its drafters.57 But whereas Rehnquist focused on Madi-
son's initial proposal and subsequent revision and comments, Souter
examined both the text the First Congress proposed and also the text
it rejected. 8 In examining what the First Congress considered but re-
jected, Justice Souter claimed to find the key that unlocks the Fram-
ers' true intentions.
According to Souter's historical excavation, the Framers consid-
ered but rejected a prohibition only against preferential aid to relig-
ion. Madison's original proposal read: "The civil rights of none shall
be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any
national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal ri hts of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed." The
text went through various amendments and revisions in the House
until the following was sent over to the Senate: "Congress shall make
no law establishing Religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed."60 The Senate first
considered the language: "Congress shall make no law establishing
One Religious Sect or Society in preference to others, nor shall the
rights of conscience be infringed."61 It rejected this language and
chose a provision identical to the House's proposal, but without the
"rights of conscience" clause. 62  Six days later, however, the Senate
55 505 U.S. 577 (1992). Academic literature cited by Justice Souter included LEONARD W.
LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986) and Douglas
Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 875 (1986).
56 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 580 ("The question before us is whether including clerical members
who offer prayers as part of the official school graduation ceremony is consistent with the Reli-
gious Clauses of the First Amendment.... .").
57 See id. at 612-16 (Souter,J., concurring) (reviewing the Establishment Clause's enactment
and finding that "the history of the Clause's textual development [provides] a more powerful
argument [than Rehnquist's Jafftee dissent] supporting the Court's jurisprudence following Ever-
son").
58 See id. at 612 (describing the various religion clause versions considered, amended, and
rejected by both the House and the Senate).
59 Id. at 612 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790)).
60 Id. at 613 (quoting I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3, 1791, at 136 (Linda Grant de Pauw ed.,
1972) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]).
61 Id. (quoting DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 60, at 151).
62 Id. at 614.
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adopted the narrow language, "Congress shall make no law establish-
ing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise of religion. 63 The Senate sent this text to the House.
Justice Souter reached his final conclusion from what happened
next. Ajoint conference committee was established to reconcile the
differences between the House and Senate versions of the future Es-
tablishment Clause. To repeat, the House had adopted the more
general language, "Congress shall make no law establishing Religion,"
while the Senate had adopted the more narrowly restrictive text,
"Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode
or worship." "The House conferees," Souter claimed, "ultimately
won out, persuading the Senate to accept this as the final text of the
Religion Clauses: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' 65 The
narrow prohibitions against only the establishment of "one religious
sect" or specific "articles of faith" were dropped. According to
Souter, "[t]he Framers repeatedly considered and deliberately re-
jected such narrow language and instead extended their prohibition
to the state support for 'religion' in general. Implicit in their choice
is the distinction between preferential and nonpreferential estab-
lishments, which the weight of evidence suggests the Framers appre-
ciated.,
66
Regarding Justice Rehnquist's citations to the Founders' actions in
support of religion, Souter offered two responses. He countered
Washington's, Adams's, and Madison's presidential proclamations of
official days of prayer and thanksgiving with Jefferson's refusal to is-
sue them because of doubts regarding their constitutionality. After
Madison left the presidency, moreover, he claimed that official days
of prayer and thanksgiving violated the Constitution. More funda-
mentally, the practices supporting religion, Souter claimed, "prove, at
best, that the Framers simply did not share a common understanding
of the Establishment Clause, and, at worst, that they, like other politi-
63 Id. (quoting DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 60, at 166).
C Id. at 613-14.
Id. at 614.
6 Id. at 614-15.
67 See id. at 623 ("President Jefferson ... steadfastly refused to issue Thanksgiving proclama-
tions of any kind, in part because he though they violated the Religion Clauses.").
See id. at 624-25 ("Upon retirement .... he concluded that '[religious proclamations by
the Executive recommending thanksgivings & fasts are shoots from the same root with the legis-
lative acts reviewed .... they imply a religious agency, making no part of the trust delegated to
political rules.'" (citation omitted)). For Madison's later reflections on the constitutionality of
presidential proclamations declaring official days of prayer and thanksgiving, see Elizabeth
Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda, "3 WM. & MARYQ. 534, 560 (1946).
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cians, could raise constitutional ideals one day and turn their back on
them the next.,
69
Three years after Weisman, Justice Souter in Rosenberger resumed
his reconstruction of an "originalist," "strict-separationist" interpreta-
tion of the Establishment Clause.70 In Rosenberger, a group of Univer-
sity of Virginia students challenged a school policy that excluded reli-
gious groups from receiving student body funds.71  According to
Justice Souter, the case raised the legal question of whether state
money could be used to fund core, sectarian religious activity. To
explain why such funding unquestionably violated the First Amend-
ment, he returned to the Founding Fathers, this time focusing on the
struggle in Virginia over religious liberty.73
In the "Memorial and Remonstrance," Souter claimed, Madison
squarely addressed the question of using public funds for religious74
purposes. In Article 3, Madison asks rhetorically, "Who does not see
that ... the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of any one estab-
lishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all
cases whatsoever?, 75 Since Madison was writing against a background
in which most colonies had exacted a tax for church support, Justice
Souter reasoned that Madison meant to indicate that "individual reli-
gious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was
stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or
all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual
or group.'"76 The same point, Justice Souter continued, was also made
by Jefferson in his "Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom."
The bill, which was passed after Madison orchestrated the defeat of
Patrick Henry's general assessment bill, declared that "to compel a
69 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 626.
70 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 868 (1995) (Souter, J., dis-
senting).
71 See id. at 827 (majority opinion) ("[The student publication] filed suit ... [and] alleged
that refusal to authorize payment of the printing costs of the publication, solely on the basis of
its religious editorial viewpoint, violated their rights to freedom of speech and press, to the free
exercise of religion, and to equal protection of the law.").
72 See id. at 863-64, 868 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court today, for the first time, ap-
proves direct funding of core religious activities by an arm of the State.").
73 See id. at 868-72 (discussing the role of Madison in ensuring the defeat of the Virginia tax
assessment bill and the passage ofJefferson's Virginia Billfor Establishing Religious Freedom).
74 See id. at 868 ("Madison gave his opinion on the legitimacy of using public funds for reli-
gious purposes, in the Memorial and Remonstrance .... ").
75 Id. (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 1 3
(1785), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, app., at 65-66 (1947) [hereinafter Madi-
son, Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted in Everson]).
76 Id. at 869 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 11).
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man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opin-
ions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."
7
In his Jaffree dissent, Justice Rehnquist questioned the relevance of
Jefferson (at all) and Madison (in the context of the Virginia debate)
for discerning the Establishment Clause's original meaning. 78 Justice
Souter never addressed these points thematically; instead, he simply
cited and reasserts Everson's contention that
We [the Supreme Court] have "previously recognized that the provisions
of the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison
and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and were
intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion
on religious liberty as the Virginia statute."
Souter also cited three leading church-state scholars-Douglas Lay-
cock, Thomas Curry, andJesse Choper-who, subsequent to Everson,
supported its conclusions.
Justice Souter's return to Virginia in Rosenberger was matched by
Justice Clarence Thomas who, for the first time, entered the
"originalist" church-state fray. Concurring with the majority and re-
sponding to Justice Souter, Justice Thomas claimed that a proper un-
derstanding of Madison does not, in fact, lead to the "wall of separa-
tion" but rather to the principles of neutrality and non-
discrimination.S1
Justice Thomas's opinion began by establishing the context of
Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance."82  Madison wrote the
"Memorial" in response to Patrick Henry's proposed religious assess-
ment tax bill.8 3  Henry's proposal, however, was not a generally-
77 Id. at 871 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), re-
printed in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 77 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)
[hereinafter THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION]).
78 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that Jef-
ferson was not an "ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment").
79 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 871 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 13).
80 Id. at 871-72 (citing JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 16 (1995)); THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST
FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 217
(1986); Laycock, supra note 55, at 923.
81 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 854, 858, 863 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Madison's comments
are more consistent with the neutrality principle that the dissent inexplicably dis-
cards.... Stripped of its flawed historical premise, the dissent's argument is reduced to the
claim that our Establishment Clause jurisprudence permits neutrality...
82 Id. at 854.
83 SeeJames Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), reprinted
in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 82 [hereinafter Madison, Memorial and Re-
monstrance] ("We the subscribers, citizens of the said Commonwealth, having taken into serious
consideration, a Bill ... entitled 'A Bill establishing a provision for Teachers of the Christian
Religion,' and conceiving that the same if finally armed with the sanctions of a law, will be a
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available subsidy program, as Justice Souter's dissent suggested; 4 it
explicitly favored Christians over non-Christians. "Madison's objec-
tion to the assessment bill," Justice Thomas thus explained, "did not
rest on the premise that religious entities may never participate on
equal terms in neutral government programs. 85  Madison opposed
the sectarian favoritism in the bill, which is why Article 4 of the "Me-
morial" claims that the bill "violate [d] that equality which ought to be
the basis of every law."86 According to Justice Thomas, "[e]ven assum-
ing that the Virginia debate on the so-called 'Assessment Controversy'
was indicative of the principles embodied in the Establishment
Clause, this incident hardly compels the dissent's conclusion that
government must actively discriminate against religion. 87 As inter-
preted by Justice Thomas, Madison's principle of religious liberty
prohibits only preferential government policies that single out reli-18
gious entities for special benefits. And even if Madison did make
comments more in line with Souter's analysis, Justice Thomas re-
peated Justice Rehnquist's position that "there is no indication that at
the time of the framing [of the Establishment Clause] he took the
dissent's extreme view that the government must discriminate against
religious adherents by excluding them from more generally available
financial subsidies."8 9
The Souter-Thomas dispute over the meaning of Madison's "Me-
morial and Remonstrance" seems to have come to a draw. 9° Neither
Justice, obviously, persuaded the other, and neitherJustice persuaded
enough members of the Court to write a majority opinion firmly built
upon his understanding of Madison. Perhaps in part because of this
deadlock, the Court drifted away from invoking the Founding Fathers
for its Establishment Clause jurisprudence from 1995-2003. Most no-
dangerous abuse of power, are bound as faithful members of a free State to remonstrate against
it ... ").
84 See Patrick Henry, A Bill Establishing A Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (Dec. 24,
1784), inJOURNAL OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (proposing a tax to be assessed for the
support of Christian religious educators).
85 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 854 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. (citing Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted in Everson, supra note 75, at
4) (alteration in original).
87 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 853 (Thomas, J., concurring).
88 See id. at 854-55 ("The assessment violated the 'equality' principle not because it allowed
religious groups to participate in a generally available government program, but because the
bill singled out religious entities for special benefits.").
89 Id. at 856-57.
90 For an interpretation of Madison that disagrees with both Justice Souter and Justice Tho-
mas, see Vincent Phillip Mufioz, James Madison's Principle of Religious Liberty, 97 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 17, 31 (2003) [hereinafter Muiioz, Madison's Principle of Religious Liberty] ("A Madisonian
interpretation of the Establishment Clause would prevent the state from supporting religion as
an end in itself, but it also would prevent the state from excluding religious individuals and or-
ganizations from generally available benefits supporting a secular purpose.").
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tably, the Court all but neglected the Founders in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, its contentious 2002 school voucher case."
C. The Federalist Alternative: Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow
The Founders returned in a surprising manner in 2004 in Elk
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the Pledge of Allegiance case.92
The case raised but failed to resolve the question of the constitution-
ality of the words "under God" in public school teacher-led recita-
tions of the Pledge.93 More significantly from an Establishment
Clause jurisprudential standpoint was Justice Thomas's abandonment
of Justice Rehnquist's "non-preferentialism" and embrace of a feder-
alist interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
According to Justice Thomas's Newdow opinion, "[t] he text and
history of the Establishment Clause strongly suggest that it is a feder-
alism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering with
state establishments. 9 4 The Framers, he suggested, "made clear that
Congress could not interfere with state establishments, notwithstand-
ing any argument that could be made based on Congress' power un-
der the Necessary and Proper Clause."95 Unlike the Free Exercise
Clause, " [ t] he Establishment Clause does not purport to protect indi-
vidual rights, 96 and thus "it makes little sense to incorporate [it] .97
Given that Justice Thomas altered his interpretation, he surpris-
ingly presented little evidence for his new approach. To demonstrate
that the Establishment Clause does not protect an individual right, he
offered less than one full paragraph of textual analysis. His primary
argument was to contrast the wording of Establishment Clause with
the other provisions of the First Amendment. "The Free Exercise
Clause," Justice Thomas stated, "plainly protects individuals against
congressional interference with the right to exercise their religion,
and the remaining Clauses within the First Amendment expressly dis-
able Congress from 'abridging [particular] fteedom[s].''9  But "re-
specting an," Justice Thomas continued, connotes a different under-
standing than "abridging."99 Why or how we are to understand this
91 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
92 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
93 The Court, instead of reaching the First Amendment issue, concluded that respondent
Michael Newdow lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id. at 6.
94 Id. at 49 (ThomasJ, concurring).
95 Id. at 50.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 49.
98 Id. at 50 (alterations in original).
99 Id. at 49-50.
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difference Thomas did not explain. He failed to address directly the
construction of "respecting an" offered by Justice Rutledge in Everson
and he neglected to analyze the words themselves. Instead, Justice
Thomas merely asserted that his textual analysis "is consistent with
the prevailing view that the Constitution left religion to the States." 00
For "the prevailing view," he referred to Justice Joseph Story's Com-
mentaries on the Constitution of the United States and Akhil Amar's The
Bill of Rights. °' Story and Amar may correctly capture "the prevailing
view" of the Founders, but citations to them alone seem inadequate
to demonstrate correctness of the assertion.
Justice Thomas also asserted that "[h]istory ... supports this [fed-
eralist] understanding.'0 2  "At the [time of the] founding," he
pointed out, "at least six States had established religions.' '0 3 While
factually correct, those states eventually disestablished their estab-
lishments.0 4 Might they have ended their establishments to comply
after the fact with the constitutional principle set forth in the Estab-
lishment Clause-an ideal that only applied to the national govern-
ment until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment but which
was adopted by states individually prior to the Civil War? Other states
at the time of the founding, moreover, ended their establishments on
account of their perceived abridgment of the principle of religious
freedom. 15 The mere fact that state establishments existed at the
100 Id. at 50.
101 Id. Justice Thomas's full citation is as follows: "See, e.g., 2J. Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1873 (5th ed. 1891); see also Amar, The Bill of Rights, at 32-
42; id., at 246-257." Id.
102 Id. at 50.
103 Id.
104 The year of disestablishment in the various states depends on how one defines a religious
establishment. Carl H. Esbeck, who defines a religious establishment as the legal authority to
assess taxes for church support, identifies the following dates for disestablishment in the origi-
nal states: Pennsylvania (no history of an establishment), Rhode Island (no history of an estab-
lishment), Delaware (1776), NewJersey (1776), North Carolina (1776), New York (1777), Vir-
ginia (1776-1779), Maryland (1785), South Carolina (1790), Georgia (1798), Connecticut
(1818), New Hampshire (1819), and Massachusetts (1832-1833). Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and
Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385,
1457-58. For a general discussion of what constitutes an establishment, see Michael W. McCon-
nell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 2105 (2003).
103 For example, Virginia's Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, which was adopted in
1785 and effective as ofJanuary 16, 1786, declared of the "natural rights of mankind":
[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his
body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief;
but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in
matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their
civil capacities.
Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (Va. 1785), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 77, at 84, 85.
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time of the drafting of the Establishment Clause is insufficient in it-
self to demonstrate that the Framers were exclusively concerned with
federalism when they adopted the Establishment Clause. These res-
ervations do not imply thatJustice Thomas's federalist thesis is incor-
rect, but given that he challenged the basic assumptions that guided
more than fifty years of jurisprudence, we might expect him to offer
more than a handful of paragraphs to demonstrate the persuasive-
ness of his position.
The remainder of this Article, in fact, argues that the Federalist
interpretation most accurately captures the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause. Justice Thomas could have drawn on a long
(albeit sporadic) history of constitutional scholarship arguing that
the original meaning of the Establishment Clause pertains to federal-
ism. 10 6 That he failed to do so suggests the need for a reinvigoration
106 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 34 (1998)
(stating that the Establishment Clause was not intended to prevent individual states from estab-
lishing a religion but rather was "pro-states' rights" and "simply calls for the issue to be decided
locally"); DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE 69 (2002) ("Jefferson's 'wall,' like the First Amendment, affirmed the policy
of federalism. This policy emphasized that all governmental authority over religious matters
was allocated to the states.... Insofar as Jefferson's 'wall,'... was primarily jurisdictional (or
structural) in nature, it offered little in the way of a substantive right or universal principle of
religious liberty."); WILBER G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 8-10 (1964) (ar-
guing that the First Amendment "embodied a principle of federalism" as it "operated, and was
intended to operate, to protect from Congressional interference the varying state policies of
church establishment"); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 18 (1995) ("The religion clauses, as under-
stood by those who drafted, proposed, and ratified them, were an exercise in federalism.");
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1157-58 (1991) (arguing
that since the Establishment Clause, in addition to its congressional prohibition on establishing
churches, prohibited Congress from disestablishing official state and local churches, incorpo-
rating the clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment becomes "quite awkward");
Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1113,
1132-35 (1988) (concluding that the Establishment Clause served as a compromise between
those states with anti-establishment policies and those with official churches by "mak[ing] it
plain that Congress was not to legislate on the subject of religion, thereby leaving the matter of
church-state relations to the individual states"); Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National
School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 10 (1949) ("[W]hat the 'establishment of religion'
clause does, and all that it does, is to forbid Congress to give any religious faith, sect, or denomination a
preferred status.... ."); Esbeck, supra note 104, at 1576 ("[The Establishment Clause] acted as a
restraint on the national government from interfering with the states and how each state's law
dealt with the matter of religion."); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise,
90 MICH. L. REv. 477, 481-82, 541 (1991) ("For the historical record is clear that when the reli-
gious language was first adopted it was designed to restrain the federal government from inter-
fering with the variety of state-church arrangements then in place."); Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., The
Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amend-
ment, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 65, 66 (1962) ("[The Establishment Clause's] inclusion was intended as
an implied grant of power over religion to the states as it affirmatively denied the federal gov-
ernment power to make any law respecting a state establishment."); Philip B. Kurland, The Ir-
relevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24
VILL. L. REV. 3, 13-14 (1978) ("The primary purpose of the amendment was to keep the na-
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of this position. Recent scholarship, moreover, has rejected the Fed-
eralist thesis on historical grounds.0 7  Prior scholars, furthermore,
have not sufficiently placed the drafting of the Establishment Clause
in its historical and political context.' ° Specifically, the failure to ap-
tional government out of religious matters.... The states were to be unaffected by the amend-
ment .... [T]here is no part of the history of the fourteenth amendment that provides any
guidance whatsoever for the application of the religious clauses to the states."); Kurt T. Lash,
Power and the Subject of Religion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1069, 1116 (1998) ("Congress had no power
whatsoever over the subject of religion. .. , power over the same being reserved to the states.");
Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Prin-
ciple, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1085, 1085, 1089-92 (1995) [hereinafter Lash, Rise of the Nonestablishment
Principle] (agreeing with other scholars that the Establishment Clause was about federalism, in
that the amendment intended only to prevent the federal government from interfering with
churches established by individual states); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adaption of the Free Exercise
Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1106, 1111-12
(1994) [hereinafter Lash, Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment] ("[T]he First
Amendment begins a theme that runs as a leitmotif throughout the original Bill of Rights, that
of federalism."); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Roll-
back of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1191 (1990) (stating that the Establishment Clause
created a "framework of federalism" that allowed states to make their own decisions regarding
religion); James McClellan, Hand's Writing on the Wall of Separation: The Significance ofJaffree in
Future Cases on Religious Establishment, in HOw DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM? 43, 48 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1987) ("The [First Amendment] was
framed, considered, and adopted with federalism in mind, and it applied only to the federal
government. Not even Madison wished to apply the establishment clause to the states ....");
Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Estab-
lishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311, 317 (1986) (arguing that the Estab-
lishment Clause was intended "to forbid establishment of a national religion and to prevent
federal interference with a state's choice of whether or not to have an official state religion");
William C. Porth & Robert P. George, Timming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Estab-
lishment Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 109, 136-39 (1987) (noting that the Establishment Clause was
intended to prevent the federal government from disestablishing or interfering with official
state churches); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954
WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 372-73, 406-07 ("[T]he Establishment Clause... should not, and histori-
cally and logically cannot, be incorporated into the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARv.
L. REV. 1700, 1701 (1992) (arguing that before Everson v. Board of Education in 1947, "the Estab-
lishment Clause did not restrain the states from promoting religion or even establishing one").
In an early religious liberty case, the Supreme Court itself recognized that "[t]he Constitu-
tion makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious lib-
erties." Permoli v. Mun. No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845).
107 See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 15, at 407-08 (noting the lack of historical support in the
debates for the Federalist interpretation).
108 For an example of legal scholarship that reflects a lack of contextual analysis, see William
C. Porth & Robert P. George, Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment
Clause, stating that:
The obvious meaning of "respecting an" establishment of religion, then as now, is "re-
garding," or "having to do with," or "in reference to" such an establishment. And these
words are broad enough to cover both a possible national establishment and actual (and
potential) state establishments. They call particular attention to the constitutional disen-
titlement of the federal government to make any law setting up an established church at
the federal level or interfering with established churches (and the right of the people to
opt to establish churches) at the state level.
Porth & George, supra note 106, at 136-37.
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preciate the Founders' diversity of approaches to church-state ar-
rangements has led to a failure to articulate with precision the Anti-
Federalists' criticisms that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
This failure, in turn, has led to misinterpretations of the original
meaning of the Establishment Clause and, correspondingly, the ap-
plication of erroneous historical narratives to modern church-state
109cases.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE DRAFTING OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
To understand the original meaning of the Establishment Clause,
we have to understand the historical context in which the First
Amendment emerged and the particular circumstances that led to
the adoption of the Bill of Rights. The fundamental fact that almost
all scholars and jurists overlook is that the Founders did not share a
uniform understanding of the proper relationship between church
and state. After the American Revolution, various states adopted dif-
ferent church-state arrangements."1 When the Constitution was pro-
posed to form a new national government, fears emerged that the
new Congress would impose one form of church-state relations
throughout the nation."' Anti-Federalists both articulated and exac-
erbated this fear in their arguments against the Constitution's ratifi-
cation."2 The Establishment Clause was crafted by Federalists to quell
these concerns and to silence their Anti-Federalist critics.
To understand the original meaning of the Establishment Clause,
then, we first must describe the two leading approaches to church-
state relations present during the founding era. This investigation
sheds light on Anti-Federalist criticisms of the Constitution and their
proposed amendments. With the Anti-Federalists' positions set forth,
we can approach the actions of the First Federal Congress in its his-
torical context. That context reveals the original meaning and clear
intention expressed in the text of the First Amendment's Establish-
ment Clause. The First Federal Congress did not constitutionalize
one proper relationship between church and state, but rather it reaf-
109 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 263-69 (discussing how the Everson Court, in both
Justice Black's majority opinion and Justice Rutledge's dissent, and Justice Souter's contempo-
rary approach apply a historically-inaccurate view of the First Amendment in determining the
scope of the Establishment Clause).
110 See infra Part II.A (discussing the two leading church-state positions: the "Massachusetts
Way" and the "Virginia Understanding").
I See infra Part II.B (discussing the Anti-Federalists' criticisms of the Constitution, including
the fear that the proposed Congress could impose uniformity of religious practice in the United
States).
l1 See infra Part II.B (noting the different statements articulated by the Anti-Federalists to
warn against a national religious establishment).
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firmed the Constitution's federal arrangement regarding church-state
matters.
A. Church-State Relationships During the Founding Era
In revolutionary America, the relationship between church and
state was anything but settled. In states where the Church of England
had been established, the necessity of new arrangements was particu-
larly acute.11 3 But even in those states that had not established Angli-
canism, reevaluation of church-state relations was part of the enor-
mous project of constitution writing. "During the Revolutionary era,
every colony-turned-State altered the Church-State arrangements it
had inherited from colonial times."'
' 4
Because state governments possessed primary legislative power
over matters of education and morals, extensive debate over the
proper relationship between church and state occurred at the state
level."1 Virginia's approach to religious freedom has received the
most legal and scholarly attention, but contrary to Justice Black's as-
sumption in Everson, it was not the only or even the most common
understanding in the new nation.
In general, two leading positions emerged. Some states, like Vir-
ginia, abolished official state establishments and ended direct gov-
ernment funding of religious clergy. What I shall call the "Virginia
Understanding" effectively privatized religion. In other states, par-
ticularly in New England, religion as such remained an object of pub-
lic funding and state concern. The "Massachusetts Way," as I will call
it, sought to use public funding and public endorsement of religion
as a means to nurture and to encourage good citizenship. The labels
"Virginia Understanding" and "Massachusetts Way" are not meant to
suggest that everyone within the respective states agreed with the po-
sition, or that the understanding belonged exclusively to that state.
The "Virginia Understanding" was contested within Virginia, as was
the "Massachusetts Way" in Massachusetts. Some of the most able de-
13 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1436 (1990) (stating that "[t]he Church of England was dis-
credited during the Revolution by its connection to the Crown and the loyalist sympathies of
most of its clergy"). Prior to 1776, Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Maryland, Geor-
gia, and some localities in New York had established the Church of England and taxed residents
for its support. Id.
114 CURRY, supra note 80, at 134.
1 See G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73, 85 (1989) (noting that
between the Declaration of Independence and the ratification of the Constitution "each of the
original thirteen states reconsidered the relationship between church and state within its bor-
ders"). For a discussion of church-state arrangements in the founding era state constitutions,
see John K. Wilson, Religion Under the State Constitutions, 1776-1800, 32J. CHURCH & ST. 753
(1990).
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fenders of the "Massachusetts Way" were Virginians, including Patrick
Henry and George Washington; some of the strongest advocates for
Virginia-like separation came from Massachusetts.' 6 Nonetheless, the
positions are associated with these two states because each enshrined
in its law one of the leading founding-era approaches to church-state
relations. "
7
1. The "Massachusetts Way"
The "Massachusetts Way" is revealed in the 1780 Massachusetts
State Constitution. Article III of that document states:
As the happiness of a people and the good order and preservation of civil
government essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality, and as
these cannot be generally diffused through a community but by the insti-
tution of the public worship of God and of public instructions in piety,
religion, and morality: Therefore, To [sic] promote their happiness and
to secure the good order and preservation of their government, the peo-
ple of this commonwealth have a right to invest their legislature with
power to authorize and require, and the legislature shall, from time to
time, authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, and
other bodies-politic or religious societies to make suitable provision, at
their own expense, for the institution of the public worship of God and
for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety,
religion, and morality in all cases where such provision shall not be made
voluntarily.1'8
At the heart of the "Massachusetts Way" lies a simple syllogism: re-
publican government requires a virtuous citizenry; the cultivation of
virtue depends on religion; therefore, supporters of republican gov-
ernment ought to support religion. These ideas were echoed most
famously by President George Washington in his Farewell Address.
"'Tis substantially true," Washington states, "that virtue or morality is
16 Isaac Backus, for example, was an evangelical Baptist from Massachusetts who, believing
that religion is a matter solely belonging between God and the individual, fought for the sepa-
ration of church and state. See, e.g., Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty
(1773), reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA: 1730-1805, at 329,
331 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991) (arguing that government must not interfere with "true and full
[religious] liberty").
17 It also should be noted that the church-state debate was not simply between pious citizens
who sotght government support of religion and the non-believers who sought separation.
Among the most strident advocates for disestablishment were devout Baptists, such as Isaac
Backus. See Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919,
933 (2004) ("Baptist leaders, such as Isaac Backus in Massachusetts and John Leland in Virginia,
took the lead in calling for an amendment guaranteeing religious freedom against the federal
government."). It would, thus, be a mistake to characterize the debate over church-state rela-
tions during the founding as one between religious faith and secular reasoning.
11 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. III, reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note
77, at 77-78.
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a necessary spring of popular government."'" 9 But virtue and moral-
ity, he warns, require religion: "And let us with caution indulge the
supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. What-
ever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on
minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to
expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious
principle.",12  Therefore, "[o]f all the dispositions and habits which
lead to political prosperity, Religion and morality are indispensable
supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who
should labour to subvert these great Pillars of human happiness,
these firmest props of the duties of Men and citizens.''
1
2
1
Because religion was believed to be essential to the development
of republican citizenship, the "Massachusetts Way" authorized tax-
payer support of religion, including the direct subsidization of reli-
gious ministers.1 22 State endorsement of religion was understood not
only to be good public policy but an essential public good.2 3 All citi-
zens, including non-religious citizens, were thought to benefit from
the general diffusion of religious morality.1
4
Religious liberty required only that an individual not be punished
for exercising his or her religion as such. As stated in the 1780 Mas-
sachusetts Constitution: "no subject shall be hurt, molested, or re-
strained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the
119 George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), in GEORGE WASHINGTON: A
COLLECTION 521, 521 (W. B. Allen ed., 1988).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 George Washington, it should be noted, did not call directly for the tax support of relig-
ion as such in his Farewell Address. During the dispute in Virginia over Patrick Henry's pro-
posed general assessment, however, Washington said he was not opposed in principle to reli-
gious taxes. See Vincent Phillip Mufioz, George Washington on Religious Liberty, 65 REV. POL. 11,
13-14 (2003) (arguing that George Washington, while not personally opposed to religious as-
sessment, was opposed to Henry's measure because "the bill caused unnecessary political tur-
moil").
13 In a letter to James Madison, Richard Henry Lee, President of the Continental Congress,
captured the same sentiment:
Refiners may weave as fine a web of reason as they please, but the experience of all times
shews [sic] Religion to be the guardian of morals-And he must be a very inattentive ob-
server in our Country, who does not see that avarice is accomplishing the destruction of
religion, for want of a legal obligation to contribute something to its support.
Letter from Richard Henry Lee to James Madison (Nov. 26, 1784), in 2 THE LETTERS OF
RICHARD HENRYLEE 304, 304 (James Curtis Ballagh ed., photo. reprint 1970) (1914).
124 For a good example of a contemporaneous defense of the "Massachusetts Way," see
Worcestriensis, Number IV, MAss. SPY, Sept. 4, 1776, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING
DURING THE FOUNDING ERA: 1760-1805, at 449, 449-54 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz
eds., 1983). Worcestriensis compares citizens who pay taxes to support religions they do not
favor to citizens who pay taxes to support wars they believe unnecessary or imprudent. Dis-
agreement alone, he suggests, does not exempt one from supporting public policy made by le-
gitimate authorities. Id. at 453.
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manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own con-
science, or for his religious profession or sentiments .... ," "
An individual's liberty of conscience, accordingly, was not under-
stood to be violated by religious taxes. Massachusetts, furthermore,
could claim that "no subordination of any one sect or denomination
to another shall ever be established by law,"126 because all taxes for the
support of religion would be directed by the taxpayer to "the gublic
teacher or teachers of his own religious sect or denomination."
2. The "Virginia Understanding"
Whereas Massachusetts represents one pole in the Founders'
world of church-state relations, Virginia occupies the other. Prior to
1776, Virginia had established the Church of England. Anglican min-
isters were dependent on the state for financial support.' Minister
salaries were paid by the government and financed by local taxa-
tion.' 2 Certain rights and privileges, moreover, were legally reserved
to Anglican clergymen-only they, for example, could perform legal
marriages. 130  Ministers of dissenting religions, mostly Presbyterians
and Baptists, were licensed, as were their meeting houses.13' To clar-
ify church-state arrangements, Patrick Henry in 1784 proposed a
property tax to fund religious ministers. 3 2  Similar to legislation an-
ticipated by the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, each property
owner was to specify the Christian denomination to which he wished
125 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. I, reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note
77, at 77.
126 Id. at art. III, reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 78.
127 Id.
28 See THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, S.J., CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787,
at 11 (1977) ("[I] t was a ministry totally dependent upon the state for its financial support.").
2 See id. (explaining how Virginia law required that every parish provide its minister with an
annual salary of 16,000 pounds of tobacco, which the town raised by collecting taxes from each
head of a household within the parish boundaries).
130 See id. at 36 ("Certain privileges, such as the exclusive right to perform marriages, were
still retained by these ministers.").
1 See id. ("The legislators had not officially yielded their authorization to license meeting-
houses and dissenting preachers.").
132 From 1776 to 1784, various church-state arrangements were proposed but none adopted
definitively. They ranged from Thomas Jefferson's "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,"
which would have ended all legally-compelled support of religion and official religious tenets,
to "A Bill Concerning Religion," proposed in 1779, which would have declared Protestant Chris-
tianity the state's established church, legally mandated five articles of faith for all incorporated
and established religious societies, and taxed all citizens for the support of Christianity. See id.
at 47-48, 56-57 (discussing the different bills considered by the Virginia legislature, including
Jefferson's proposal and the "Bill Concerning Religion"). The strongest action the House of
Delegates took during this period was to suspend, starting in 1776, the tax that provided salaries
for Anglican clergy. See id. at 48 ("[A]s had been its custom since 1776, the Assembly voted
once again to suspend the salaries of the established clergy for another session.").
[Vol. 8:4
Aug. 2006] ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE 609
his tax directed.'33 Tax dollars were to be used to support "a Minister
or Teacher of the Gospel... or the providing places of divine wor-
ship, and to none other use whatsoever.""' But unlike Massachusetts,
which was dominated by Congregationalists, in religiously diverse
Virginia, the general assessment met legislative defeat. 35  Shortly
thereafter, James Madison proposed and the Virginia legislature
adopted Thomas Jefferson's "A Bill for Establishing Religious Free-
dom.,,36
Jefferson's bill declared "that no man shall be compelled to fre-
quent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatso-
ever .... [and] that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument
to maintain their opinion in matters of religion." 37 "[T]o compel a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opin-
ions which he disbelieves ... is sinful and tyrannical .... ,,18 Forcing
an individual to support his own church was not declared a violation
of the individual's rights, but it was denounced as a deprivation "of
the comfortable liberty of giving his contribution to the particular
pastor whose morals he feels most persuasive to righteousness."
3 9
The legislation concluded "that the rights hereby asserted are of the
natural rights of mankind , and thus could not be repealed legiti-
mately without violating "natural right.'
41
While Jefferson's bill states its position as a matter of principle,
the reasons behind it also include prudential judgments. 42 James
133 See id. at 58 ("[E]ach person could determine which religious society, among those be-
longing to the establishment, would receive his allotment.").
A Bill "Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion" (1784), reprinted in
BUCKLEY, supra note 128, app. 2 at 189. If a taxpayer failed or refused to specify a Christian so-
ciety, his tax would go to the public treasury "to be disposed of under the direction of the Gen-
eral Assembly, for the encouragement of seminaries of learning ... and to no other use or pur-
pose whatsoever." Id. An exception to this rule was made for Quakers and Mennonites who,
because they lacked the requisite clergy, were allowed to place their distribution in their gen-
eral funds "to be disposed of in a manner which they shall think best calculated to promote
their particular method of worship." Id.
135 See 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 383 (1950) (not-
ing that the issue of a general religious assessment was "finally killed" in the Virginia legislature
in October 1785); see also BUCKLEY, supra note 128, at 144-55 (describing the political effort and
situation that led to the defeat of Patrick Henry's bill in 1785).
1 See BUCKLEY, supra note 128, at 162-63 (describing the passage in 1786 ofJefferson's bill).
137 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (drafted in 1777, adopted in
1786), reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMASJEFFERSON 251, 253 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1977).
3 Id. at 252.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 253.
141 Id.
142 Commentators on the Virginia Statute have emphasized its indebtedness to Locke's po-
litical philosophy. S. Gerald Sandier sets forth a side-by-side comparison of Locke's A Letter Con-
cerning Toleration, Jefferson's notes on the Letter, and Jefferson's A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom, which demonstrates Jefferson's indebtedness to Locke. See S. Gerald Sandier, Lockean
Ideas in Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 21 J. HIST. IDEAS 110, 110
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Madison summarized this perspective years later when reflecting on
Virginia's experiment in separating church and state. "We are teach-
ing the world the great truth," he wrote to Edward Livingston in
1822, "that [governments] do better without Kings [and] Nobles than
with them. The merit will be doubled by the other lesson that Relig-
ion flourishes in greater purity, without than with the aid of [gov-
ernment] .,143 In 1821, Madison wrote to F. L. Schaeffer: "The ex-
perience of the United States is happy disproof of the error so long
rooted in the unenlightened minds of well-meaning Christians, as
well as in the corrupt hearts of persecuting usurpers, that without a
legal incorporation of religious and civil polity, neither could be sup-
ported."'44
Madison saw evidence of what supporters of the "Massachusetts
Way" thought could not be true: religion does not need government
support to flourish and, therefore, republican government does not
need to support religion. Madison argued that religiously-inspired
moral character was nurtured better by limiting government's influ-
ence on religion. To the extent that ecclesiastical and political au-
thority were united, both were corrupted. "During almost fifteen
centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial.
What have been its fruits?" Madison asked rhetorically in his "Memo-
rial and Remonstrance." 45  His answer: "More or less in all places,
pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity,
in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution." '46 The effect of eccle-
siastical establishments on civil society was similarly baneful: "In
some instances [ecclesiastical establishments] have been seen to erect
a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; in many in-
stances they have been seen upholding the thrones of political tyr-
anny: in no instances have they been seen the guardians of the liber-
ties of the people."'147 Led by Jefferson and Madison, Virginia ended
(1960) ("[T]here is probably no single document in American religious history which exempli-
fies [Locke's] influence more clearly than Thomas Jefferson's A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom."). A more theoretical explanation of Jefferson's debt to Locke has been set forth by
Sanford Kessler. See Sanford Kessler, Locke's Influence on Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom," 25 J. CHURCH & ST. 231, 232 (1983) ("While there is considerable disagreement
among scholars over the theoretical origins of the Declaration of Independence, it is generally
believed that the primary sources forJefferson's ['Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom'] are
the writings of John Locke.").
145 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON: 1819-1836, at 98, 102-03 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
144 Letter from James Madison to F. L. Schaeffer (Dec. 3, 1821), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER
'NRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON: 1816-1828, at 242, 242-43 (New York, R. Worthington 1884).
145 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 83, at 82, 83.
146 Id.
147 Id. For an explanation of Madison's argument regarding the harmful effects resulting
from the unification of ecclesiastical and political authority, see Vincent Phillip Mufioz, Religious
Liberty and the American Founding, 138 INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 33, 38-39 (2003).
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most state regulation of reli gi'on and embraced a libertarian ap-
proach to church-state matters.
For purposes of ascertaining the original meaning of the Estab-
lishment Clause, it is unnecessary to decide whether the "Massachu-
setts Way" or the "Virginia Understanding" was more authentically
American or more fully adopted the principle of religious liberty.
What must be understood is that at the time of the American found-
ing two distinct approaches to church-state relations emerged.149 The
more traditional and conservative understanding emphasized the in-
dispensable role of religion for the cultivation of republican citizen-
ship. Those who embraced the "Massachusetts Way" promoted gov-
ernmental endorsement and equal support of religion as good public
policy. They believed direct funding of religious ministers through
religious taxes furthered the common good. Such an understand-
ing guided church-state relations in much of New England, including
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont.15 ' The newer, more lib-
148 See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 22-23
(2000) (arguing that the Framers separated church and state because to do otherwise would
not only create discord and persecution, but would also weaken the religious group that was the
beneficiary of governmental establishment).
149 See supra Parts II.A.1-2 (discussing the Massachusetts and Virginia approaches).
150 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (expressing the idea that supporting relig-
ion was viewed as being part of promoting the public good).
1 Until 1818, Connecticut functioned under its Colonial Charter of 1662, which erected a
congregational establishment. For a discussion of the "enormous" social and political influence
of the established Congregational ministry, see STOKES, supra note 135, at 408-14.
The sixth article of New Hampshire's bill of rights declared:
As morality and piety, rightly grounded on evangelical principles, will give the best and
greatest security to government, and will lay in the hearts of men the strongest obliga-
tions to due subjection; and as the knowledge of these, is most likely to be propagated
through a society by the institution of the public worship of the DEIrY, and of public in-
struction in morality and religion; therefore, to promote those important purposes, the
people of this state have a right to impower, and do hereby fully impower the legislature
to authorize from time to time, the several towns, parishes, bodies corporate, or religious
societies within this state, to make adequate provision at their own expence, for the sup-
port and maintenance of public protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality ....
N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I-The Bill of Rights, art. Vt, reprinted in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES,
AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2453, 2454
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]
Vermont's Constitution of 1777, similarly, declared:
Laws for the encouragement of virtue and prevention of vice and immorality, shall
be made and constantly kept in force; and provision shall be made for their due execu-
tion; and all religious societies or bodies of men, that have or may be hereafter united
and incorporated, for the advancement of religion and learning, or for other pious and
charitable purposes, shall be encouraged and protected in the enjoyment of the privi-
leges, immunities and estates which they, in justice, ought to enjoy, under such regula-
tions, as the General Assembly of this State shall direct.
VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § XLI, reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES
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ertarian approach that emerged in Virginia rejected the idea that
government needed to support religion financially for religion to
flourish.'52 Leaders of the "Virginia Understanding" sought to end
the unification of governmental and ecclesiastical authority by ending
the monopolistic position that established denominations enjoyed.
5
They sought to let religious societies stand on their own, just like any
other non-governmental organizations. Virginia produced the most
philosophical defense of this position, which was also adopted in
Rhode Island and New York.
154
Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3737, 3748 (Francis Newton
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (discussing the view that government sup-
port is not needed for religion to thrive).
153 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (explaining the monopoly that some de-
nominations enjoyed).
54 Until 1842, Rhode Island continued under its Colonial Charter of 1663, which declared as
part of its "livlie (sic] experiment" that no person
shall bee [sic] any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any dif-
ferences in opinione [sic] in matters of religion, and doe [sic] not actually disturb the
civill [sic] peace of our sayd [sic] colony; but that all and everye [sic] person and persons
may, from tyme [sic] to tyme [sic], and at all tymes [sic] hereafter, freelye [sic] and
fullye [sic] have and enjoye [sic] his and theire [sic] owne [sic] judgments and con-
sciences, in matters of religious concemments.
Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations-1663, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 151, at 3211, 3212-13.
New York's 1777 Constitution declared,
whereas we are required, by the benevolent principles of rational liberty, not only to ex-
pel civil tyranny, but also to guard against that spiritual oppression and intolerance
wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked priests and princes have
scourged mankind, this convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of the
good people of this State, ordain, determine, and declare, that the free exercise and en-
joyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty
of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentious-
ness, orjustify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC 1LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES
Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2623, 2636-37 (Francis Newton
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. New York's Constitu-
tion of 1777 also abrogated all parts of the common and statutory law of England and of colo-
nial statutes and acts that "may be construed to establish or maintain any particular denomina-
tion of Christians or their ministers." Id. at art. XXXV, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2635-36.
Other states sought to take a position somewhere between the poles of Massachusetts and
Virginia. Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1776, for example, made no provision for a religious
establishment and recognized "[t] hat all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding." PA.
CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. II, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra, at 3081, 3082. However, the constitution further mandated that
each member [of the House of Representatives], before he takes his seat, shall make and
subscribe the following declaration, viz: I do believe in one God, the creator and governor of the
universe, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the wicked. And I do acknowledge the Scrip-
tures of the Old and New Testament to be given by Divine inspiration.
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Id. at The Frame of Government, § 10, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra,
at 3081, 3085. Georgia's Constitution of 1777, similarly, provided that "[alll persons whatever
shall have the free exercise of their religion; provided it be not repugnant to the peace and
safety of the State; and shall not, unless by consent, support any teacher or teachers except
those of their own profession," but that members of the House of Assembly-the state legisla-
ture-had to be "of the Protestant religion." GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. VI, LVI, reprinted in 2
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 777, 779, 784 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS]. It appears that Pennsylvania and Georgia sought, at least among office hold-
ers, to maintain the religious character believed necessary for republican government while, at
the same time, limiting direct governmental financial support for religion.
Other states introduced non-preferential restrictions regarding an establishment but main-
tained sectarian limits on office holding. New Jersey's Constitution of 1776, for example, rec-
ognized the rights of conscience and prohibited the establishment of one religious sect over
others, but limited office holding to Protestants. See N.J. CONST. of 1776, arts. XVIII-XIX, re-
printed in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2594, 2597-98. Delaware's Constitu-
tion of 1776, similarly, prohibited the establishment of any one sect in preference to another
but required office holders to subscribe to the following declaration: "I, A B, do profess faith in
God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for
evermore; and I do acknowledge the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given
by divine inspiration." DEL. CONST. of 1776, arts. 22, 29, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES,
AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 562, 566-68
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. North
Carolina's Constitution of 1776 abolished the "establishment of any one religious church or
denomination in this State, in preference to any other." N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXX1V, re-
printed in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2787, 2793. The same constitution,
however, barred from public office or place of trust any one "who shall deny the being of God
or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old or New Testa-
ments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with the freedom and safety of the
State." Id. at art. XXXII.
In 1835, North Carolina amended its constitution to bar from office anyone who denied the
truth of the "Christian" religion. See Gary R. Govert, Something There Is that Doesn't Love a Wall:
Reflections on the History of North Carolina's Religious Test for Public Office, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1085
(1986) ("[T]he convention approved a compromise amendment and substituted the word
'Christian' for 'Protestant' in article XXXII."). "The [North Carolina Constitutional]
[C]onvention of 1868 adopted a religious test disqualifying from office 'all persons who shall
deny the being of Almighty God.'" Id. at 1086 (quoting N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 5).
"[W]hen the North Carolina General Assembly presented a new constitution to the electorate
in 1970, the religious test remained intact." Id. at 1087 (footnote omitted). To this day, article
VI, section 8 of the North Carolina Constitution disqualifies from elective office "any person
who shall deny the being of Almighty God." N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
The Maryland Constitution of 1776 explicitly authorized the state legislature to tax citizens
"for the support of the Christian religion." MD. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, art.
XXXIII, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWs OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1686, 1689 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [here-
inafter 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. However, when a general assessment was pro-
posed in 1784, it failed. In 1795, Maryland adopted a constitutional amendment requiring all
office holders to "subscribe a declaration of his belief in the Christian religion." Id. at art. LV,
reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1700.
South Carolina was something of an outlier within the early state constitutions. Article
XXXVIII of its 1778 Constitution explicitly stated, "The Christian Protestant religion shall be
deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to be, the established religion of this State."
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B. The Anti-Federalists' Criticisms of the Constitution
In the minds of most Anti-Federalists, the loose collection of indi-
viduals opposed to constitutional ratification, the differences in
church-state arrangements at the state level signaled the impossibility
of a harmonious, consolidated union.155 Employing a number of dif-
ferent arguments (some of which contradicted one another), Anti-
Federalists claimed that the proposed constitution threatened reli-
gious freedom. They lacked sufficient strength to defeat the Consti-
tution outright, but they managed to extract the promise that
amendments would be considered.' The Establishment Clause, in
particular, was adopted to alleviate fears among the general popula-
tion aroused by Anti-Federalist criticisms.157 To understand the Estab-
lishment Clause's original meaning, then, requires that we address
the Anti-Federalists' criticisms of the Constitution.
On the point of religion, Anti-Federalists had an immediate and
distinct advantage in the ratification debate. The proposed constitu-
tion was nearly silent regarding religion, 158 which allowed Anti-
The article then proceeded to list five articles of faith to which all religious societies petitioning
for establishment and incorporation had to subscribe. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII, re-
printed in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 151, at 3248, 3255-56. In 1790,
South Carolina adopted a constitution that omitted provisions regarding an establishment or
articles of faith and declared: "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed within this
State to all mankind... ." S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 151, at 3258, 3264.
155 See infra text accompanying notes 159-64 (noting the fears among Anti-Federalists that a
national religious establishment would be coercive due to the religious diversity in the United
States).
156 Even with the prospect of amendments, the Constitution nearly met defeat: Massachu-
setts ratified by a vote of 187-168; New Hampshire, 57-46; Virginia, 89-79; New York, 30-27.
See VA. COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOV'T, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: WITH A SUMMARY OF THE ACTIONS BY THE STATES IN RATIFICATION OF THE PROVISIONS
THEREOF 24 (JamesJ. Kilpatrick ed., 1961) (summarizing the ratification votes).
157 For a superb recent history of ratification politics, see ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM
PARCHMENT TO POWER: How JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE
CONSTITUTION (1997).
158 The Philadelphia Convention spent very little time addressing church-state matters. With
little recorded debate, the delegates prohibited religious tests or qualification for any federal
office. Charles Pinckney first proposed the ban on August 20, 1787. See Journal (Aug. 20,
1787), reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 334, 335 (Max Far-
rand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787] ("No
religious test or qualification shall ever be annexed to any oath of office under the authority of
the United States .... ."). It was referred to the committee of five, and then on August 30, 1787,
a slightly modified version of Pinckney's proposal passed unanimously. See Journal (Aug. 30,
1787), reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra, at 457, 461
(documenting passage of the Article VI ban on religion-tested federal positions). See generally
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND
EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 92-97 (1964) (documenting the
common use of religion tests in the colonies); Gerald V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and
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Federalists to appeal to fear of the unknown and to parade the possi-
bility of numerous potential abuses of powers. The primary criticism
the Anti-Federalists leveled was that the proposed Congress, through
its power to make all laws "necessary and proper," could impose uni-
formity of religious practice through the establishment of a national
religion.1 5 9  According to "Deliberator," a Pennsylvania Anti-
Federalist:
Congress may, if they shall think it for the "general welfare," establish an
uniformity in religion throughout the United States. Such establish-
ments have been thought necessary, and have accordingly taken place in
almost all the other countries in the world, and will, no doubt, be
thought equally necessary in this. 60
Most Anti-Federalists did not object to religious establishments per se,
but feared a national establishment because of the religious diversity
in the nation. Given such diversity, "A Countryman" explained that a
national religious establishment would "make every body worship
God in a certain way, whether the people thought it right or no, and
punish them severely, if they would not."'6 ' "Agrippa," one of the
most articulate of Massachusetts' Anti-Federalists, summarized the
matter as follows:
Attention to religion and good morals is a distinguishing trait in our
[Massachusetts] character. It is plain, therefore, that we require for our
the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone of Itself 37 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 674,
678-79 (1987) (asserting that the Article VI religion test ban was not meant to indicate a "con-
stitutional philosophy" of religious freedom, but instead to allow that freedom to develop natu-
rally); Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Constitution's Forgotten Religion Clause: Reflections on the Article VI
Religious Test Ban, 38J. CHURCH & ST. 261, 293-94 (1996) ("[Article VI is] a clause deliberately
calculated to ensure sect equality before the law and promote institutional independence of
civil government from ecclesiastical domination at the federal level."); James E. Wood, Jr., "No
Religious Test Shall Ever Be Required'" Reflections on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, 29 J.
CHURCH & ST. 199, 201 (1987) (noting that the religion test ban was without historical prece-
dent and was "at variance with the prevailing patterns and practices in all of the original colo-
nies, and during their early years of statehood"). Toward the end of the convention, a proposal
by James Madison and Charles Pinckney to grant Congress power "to establish an University, in
which no preference or distinctions should be allowed on account of religion" was defeated.
Madison (Sept. 14, 1787), reprinted in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, su-
pra, at 612, 616. The provision regarding religion, however, does not appear to have played any
part in that vote. The only recorded debate on the matter includes two sentences in opposition
by New York delegate Gouverneur Morris, who claimed such a university was unnecessary. See
id. (recording a vote of four delegates in favor and six opposed, with one divided).
159 But see Gary D. Glenn, Forgotten Purposes of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 49 REV. POL.
340, 341-42 (1987) (providing a different account of the Anti-Federalists' objections to the
Constitution and how they influenced the drafting of the Establishment Clause by arguing that
Anti-Federalists demanded the clause to counter the anti-religiousness of the original Constitu-
tion).
160 Essay by Deliberator, FREEMAN'S J. (Philadelphia), Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 3 THE
COMPLETEANTI-FEDERALIST 176, 179 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981).
161 Letters from a Countryman (V), N.Y. J., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 86, 87 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981).
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regulation laws, which will not suit the circumstances of our southern
brethren, and the laws made for them would not apply to us. Unhappi-
ness would be the uniform product of such laws; for no state can be
happy, when the laws contradict the general habits of the people, nor can
any state retain its freedom, while there is a power to make and enforce
such laws. We may go further, and say, that it is impossible for any single
legislature so fully to comprehend the circumstances of the different
parts of a ver extensive dominion, as to make laws adapted to those cir-
cumstances.
The warning against a national religious establishment was part of the
Anti-Federalist argument that a country as large as the United States
could not remain free under a set of uniform laws. Influenced by
Montesquieu's maxim that republican government can encompass
only a small territory and that rule in large territories necessarily
tends towards tyranny,163 Anti-Federalists claimed that the new consti-
tution would result in centralization, consolidation, and-through
enforced uniformity--despotism.
64
Anti-Federalists also criticized the Constitution's failure to protect
explicitly the "liberty of conscience" or "free exercise of religion"
from infringement by the proposed national government. The
charge was part of the Anti-Federalist condemnation of the Constitu-
tion for its lack of a bill of rights.165 Anti-Federalists typically grouped
"liberty of conscience" or "free exercise of religion" with other indi-
vidual rights they thought insecure, such as unreasonable search and
seizure. "The Federal Farmer," one of the most able Anti-Federalist
essayists, set forth the charge as follows:
It is true, we [the people of the United States] are not disposed to
differ much, at present, about religion; but when we are making a consti-
tution, it is to be hoped, for ages and millions yet unborn, why not estab-
lish the free exercise of religion, as a part of the national compact.
There are other essential rights, which we have justly understood to be
the rights of freemen; as freedom from hasty and unreasonable search
162 Letters of Agrippa (XII), MASS. GAZETrE, Jan. 11, 1788, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 93, 94 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981).
163 See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAws 122 (Prome-
theus Books 2002) (1748) (positing a connection between population size and despotic rule in
that "[a] large empire supposes a despotic authority in the person who governs"). Whether the
Anti-Federalists interpreted Montesquieu properly is an altogether separate question.
I See generally HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 15-37 (1981)
(discussing the Anti-Federalist concern with unlimited (in their view) powers of the national
government and the consolidation that such powers would bring).
165 See id. at 64 (noting that the Anti-Federalists stressed three kinds of rights in their call for
a bill of rights: "common law procedural rights in criminal prosecutions, liberty of conscience,
and liberty of the press").
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warrants, warrants not founded on oath, and not issued with due caution,
for searching and seizing men's papers, property, and persons.166
"Liberty of conscience" and "free exercise of religion" were used in-
terchangeably by Anti-Federalists-terms that, unfortunately, they did
not define with precision.167  What is clear, however, is that Anti-
Federalists understood "liberty of conscience" or "free exercise of re-
ligion" to be an individual right.6 8 Equally important to note is that
Anti-Federalists never championed a right or principle of "no estab-
lishment."1 6 9 Anti-Federalists disparaged religious establishments only
in connection with a consolidated, unlimited national government.
Because of the religious diversity in America, they argued, any sectar-
ian national religious establishment inevitably would contradict the
habits of at least some of the people.170 But Anti-Federalists did not
argue that non-establishment was necessary to protect free exercise at
the local level.
A third Anti-Federalist criticism, advanced most strenuously in
New England, concentrated on the absence of a clear endorsement
of religion within the Constitution. "Samuel," a Massachusetts Anti-
Federalist, charged that "all religion is expressly rejected, from the
Constitution.",7 ' "If civil rulers won't acknowledge God, he won't ac-
knowledge them. ... ,,172 "Samuel" focused on the Constitution's spe-
cific prohibition of religious tests for office, suggesting that it evinced
a design to subjugate, if not eliminate, religion. Like many propo-
nents of the "Massachusetts Way," he argued that republican gov-
ernment requires religion, and, therefore, he condemned the pro-
166 Letters from the Federal Farmer (IV) (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 245, 249 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981). See generally HerbertJ. Storing, Introduction
to Letters from the Federal Farmer, 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 214-17 (discussing
the authorship and merits of the "Federal Farmer" letters).
167 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 113, at 1488 ("[fl n many of the debates in the preconstitu-
tional period, the concepts of 'liberty of conscience' and 'free exercise of religion' were used
interchangeably."). The interrelatedness of the terms pre-dates the founding period. William
Penn, for example, defined "liberty of conscience" in 1670 as follows:
By Liberty of Conscience, we understand not only a meer [sic] Liberty of the Mind, in believ-
ing or disbelieving this or that Principle or Doctrine, but the Exercise of ourselves in a visible
Way of Worship, upon our believing it to be indispensibly [sic] required at our Hands, that if we
neglect it for Fear or Favour of any Mortal Man, we Sin, and incur Divine Wrath ....
William Penn, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience (1670), reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS
OF WILLIAM PENN 79, 85-86 (Andrew R. Murphy ed., 2002).
168 See STORING, supra note 164, at 64 (describing the Anti-Federalists' call for a bill of rights
to protect the "liberty of individual conscience").
169 Id. at 23 (noting that "[m]any Anti-Federalists supported and would even have strength-
ened the mild religious establishments that existed in some states").
170 See supra text accompanying notes 161-62 (discussing the Anti-Federalists' arguments
against a nationally-established religion).
171 Essay by Samuel, INDEP. CHRON. & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER (Boston), Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted
in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 162, at 191, 195.
172 Id. at 196.
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posed Constitution for failing to nurture explicitly religious senti-
ment.113  This third criticism was advanced most strenuously in New
England. Insofar as it implicitly demanded that the national gov-
ernment take cognizance of religion, it stood in tension with the Anti-
Federalist arguments that sought to limit the proposed national gov-
ernment's jurisdiction over religious matters.
During the ratification debates, Federalists responded to these
criticisms by repeatedly arguing that the proposed federal govern-
ment possessed only delegated powers and that no power was dele-
gated concerning religion. The Constitution, they therefore claimed,
did not need to be amended to safeguard religious freedom. James
Iredell, in North Carolina's ratifying convention, offers an example of
the standard Federalist argument:
[Congress] certainly ha[s] no authority to interfere in the establishment
of any religion whatsoever; and I am astonished that any gentleman
should conceive they have. Is there any power given to Congress in mat-
ters of religion? Can they pass a single act to impair our religious liber-
ties? If they could, it would be a just cause of alarm.... If any future
Congress should pass an act concerning the religion of the country, it
would be an act which they are not authorized to pass, by the Constitu-
tion, and which the people would not obey. Every one would ask, "Who
authorized the government to pass such an act? It is not warranted by
the Constitution, and is barefaced usurpation.,
7 5
173 For an elaboration of this argument, see Letter by David, MASS. GAZETrE, Mar. 7, 1788, re-
printed in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 162, at 246, 246-48.
174 See STORING, supra note 164, at 65 (noting that the Anti-Federalists' emphasis on the ne-
cessity of a bill of rights "reflects the failure of the Anti-Federalists" insofar as it "implied a fun-
damental acceptance of the 'consolidated' character of the new [federal] government").
175 James Iredell, Statement at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 30, 1788), re-
printed in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 192, 194 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1996) (1836) [here-
inafter 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS]. For further example of commentary
made at the state conventions, see Edmund Randolph, Statement at the Virginia Ratifying Con-
vention (June 10, 1788), reprinted in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION
AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 194, 204 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc.
1996) (1836) [hereinafter 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS] (arguing that "no
power is given expressly to Congress over religion," but rather that the "exclusion of religious
tests is an exception from this general provision, with respect to oaths or affirmations"); Ed-
mund Randolph, Statement at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 15, 1788), reprinted in 3
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra, at 463, 469 (asserting that religious free-
dom is protected by the omission of additional provisions in the Constitution); James Bowdoin,
Statement at the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 23, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 81, 87 (Jonathan El-
liot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1901) (1836) [hereinafter 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS] ("[I]t would require a volume to describe [the rights of particular states], as
they extend to every subject of legislation, not included in the powers vested in Congress.");
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Since the Constitution did not grant authority to Congress over relig-
ion, Federalists claimed, Congress could not establish a religion or
disestablish an existing establishment in the several states. State gov-
ernments retained complete jurisdiction over such matters, and the
federal government posed no threat to religious liberty.1
6
C. Proposed Religion Amendments to the Constitution
As mentioned, the Anti-Federalists lacked the support to defeat
ratification outright, but they did manage to obtain the promise of
amendments. Seven states included amendments with their official
notices of ratification.'" Two types of alterations were submitted:
structural amendments that limited (or explicitly recognized the im-
James Madison, Statement at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), reprinted in 3
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra, at 328, 330 (citing the plurality of religions
in the United States as a safeguard against religious tyranny, as part of a larger argument against
a bill of rights); Theophilus Parsons, Statement at the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan.
23, 1788), in 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra, at 88, 90 ("It has been ob-
jected that the Constitution provides no religious test by oath, and we may have in power un-
principled men, atheists and pagans. No man can wish more ardently... that all our public
offices may be filled by men who fear God and hate wickedness; but it must be filled with the
electors to give the government this security."). For further discussion of the Federalist re-
sponse in the state ratifying conventions, see Snee, supra note 106, at 373-77. The most well-
known Federalist explanation of the Constitution's lack of a bill of rights, of course, is offered
by Alexander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST No. 84. See alsoJames Wilson, Statement at the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct. 28, 1787), reprinted in 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, supra, at 434, 435-37 (asserting that a bill of rights would interfere with the res-
ervation of personal powers that ensures protection of rights).
176 As his remarks continued, Iredell offered a second response characteristic of the Federal-
ist argument contrasting the Constitution's guarantee of a republican form of government with
its absence of a guarantee of religious freedom:
It has been asked by that respectable gentleman (Mr. Abbot) what is the meaning of that
part, where it is said that the United States shall guaranty to every state in the Union a re-
publican form of government, and why a guaranty of religious freedom was not included.
The meaning of the guaranty provided was this: There being thirteen governments con-
federated upon a republican principle, it was essential to the existence and harmony of
the confederacy that each should be a republican government, and that no state should
have a right to establish an aristocracy or monarchy. That clause was therefore inserted
to prevent any state from establishing any government but a republican one. Every one
must be convinced of the mischief that would ensue, if any state had a right to change its
government to a monarchy. If a monarchy was established in any one state, it would en-
deavor to subvert the freedom of the others, and would, probably, by degrees succeed in
it.... It is, then, necessary that the members of a confederacy should have similar gov-
ernments. But consistently with this restriction, the states may make what change in
their own governments they think proper. Had Congress undertaken to guaranty reli-
gious freedom, or any particular species of it, they would then have had a pretence to in-
terfere in a subject they have nothing to do with. Each state, so far as the clause in ques-
tion does not interfere, must be left to the operation of its own principles.
Iredell, Statement at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 30, 1788), supra note 175,
at 194-95.
177 Those states are Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York,
North Carolina, and Rhode Island.
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plicit limits of) congressional power, and declarations of personal
rights. Every state that proposed alterations (except for New Hamp-
shire, the first state to submit amendments) divided their proposals
into two distinct lists, labeling those pertaining to structure, "amend-
ments," and labeling those pertaining to individual rights, "declara-
tion of rights."
Five states submitted alterations touching on religion.1 78 Within its
"declaration of rights" (the list of alterations relating to personal
rights), Virginia proposed:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence; and therefore all men have an equal, natural, and unal-
ienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be fa-
vored or established, by law, in preference to others.
1 79
North Carolina and Rhode Island repeated Virginia's proposal in
their "declarations of rights."' s New York's ratifying convention de-
clared: "That the people have an equal, natural, and unalienable
right freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, according to the
dictates of conscience; and that no religious sect or society ought to
be favored or established by law in preference to others."8 ' New
Hampshire, which provided a single list of constitutional amend-
ments, offered the following: "Congress shall make no laws touching
religion, or to infringe the rights of conscience." 82
178 Those states are New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island
(belatedly). I omit from discussion South Carolina's proposal, which sought to amend the no-
religious-test clause in Article VI to read, "no other religious test shall ever be required." JOHN
WITrE,JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES 303 n.29 (2000) (emphasis added) (noting the irrelevance of South Carolina's pro-
posal as it "received no support each time it was raised"). In two other states (Pennsylvania and
Maryland), the minority that lost the ratification fight outright published proposed amend-
ments, though these lacked the states' official sanctions. See RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 79 (Michael S. Ariens & Robert A. Destro eds., 2d ed. 2002) (providing
the proposed amendments concerning religion from the Pennsylvania and Maryland minori-
ties).
1 Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 27,
1788), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 15, 16 [hereinafter Virginia
Ratifying Convention].
180 See Declaration of Rights and Other Amendments, North Carolina Ratifying Convention
(Aug. 1, 1788), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 17, 18 (duplicating
Virginia's religion clause in North Carolina's resolution of the Declaration of Rights).
181 New York Ratification of Constitution (July 26, 1788), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 11, 12.
182 New Hampshire Ratification of the Constitution (June 21, 1788), reprinted in 1 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONvENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at
325, 326 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1996) (1836) [hereinafter 1
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS].
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The alterations proposed by the state ratifying conventions reflect
two distinct approaches to address Anti-Federalist concerns. New
Hampshire's proposal emphasized the limits on the new govern-
ment's power by declaring Congress's lack of power to make "laws
touching religion.' 83 The blanket prohibition seems to have been in-
tended to ensure that the states would retain plenary power over reli-
gious matters. The explicit use of the word "Congress" seems to have
been intended to emphasize that body's limited powers and to reaf-
firm the federal character of the new nation. It clearly prohibited
federal interference with state religious establishments or the lack
thereof. New Hampshire's amendment also prohibited Congress
from making laws that "infringe the rights of conscience, ''.. 4 thus ad-
dressing the Anti-Federalist concern over the Constitution's lack of
an explicit recognition of this fundamental personal right. Virginia's
proposal stated similarly that "all men have an equal, natural, and
unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience,"'' 15 which was a modification of Article XVI of
the Virginia Declaration of Rights. 1
6
Despite this similarity, a significant difference existed between the
two states' proposals. Virginia's amendment was not explicitly fed-
eral. It aimed to regulate how Congress might exercise its power by
including the following no-preference provision: "no particular reli-
gious sect or society ought to be favored or established, by law, in
preference to others.""" New York followed Virginia's lead and also
proposed a no-preference amendment: "no religious sect or society
ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others."
' 
8
Whereas New Hampshire appears to have sought to recognize Con-
gress's lack of power, Virginia and New York seem to have sought to
regulate how Congress would exercise its expansive powers. That is,
instead of reaffirming federalism and thereby denying Congress ju-
risdiction over church-state matters, Virginia and New York seem to
have conceded that Congress likely would legislate on matters regard-
ing religion and sought, therefore, to prevent the federal government
from preferring one sect over others.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 179, at 16.
186 See Virginia Declaration of Rights, § 16 (June 12, 1776), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 70 (laying a foundation for the State's religion amendment
that followed two years later).
187 Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 179, at 16.
188 New York Ratification of Constitution, supra note 181, at 12.
189 See STORING, supra note 164, at 65 (noting that the Anti-Federalists' emphasis on the ne-
cessity of a bill of fights "reflects a failure of the Anti-Federalists" insofar as it "implied a funda-
mental acceptance of the 'consolidated' character of the new [federal] government").
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The difference between New Hampshire's federal amendment
and Virginia's no-preference proposal can be traced to Patrick Henry,
a dominant figure in Virginia's Ratifying Convention and the prob-
able author of Virginia's proposed amendment.'' A vehement op-
ponent of the proposed Constitution, Henry insisted that the new na-
tional government was not one of limited, delegated powers.191
Virginia's Federalists had argued that no amendment relating to re-
ligion was necessary because, in James Madison's words, "It]here is
not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with
religion. Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usur-
pation. Henry thought such assurances were insufficient. To re-
but the Federalists' delegated powers argument, he highlighted the
explicit limitations on federal power listed in Article I, Section 9 of
the Constitution. 193 Those reservations, Henry explained, were like a
bill of rights; but that the Philadelphia Convention itself thought it
necessary to protect some rights explicitly belied the Federalist argu-
ment that a bill of rights was not necessary. 114 The existence of stated
reservations on Congress's power, "reverses the position of the
friends of this Constitution, that every thing is retained which is not
given up."'9 5 The inclusion of a minimal bill of rights reveals the
truth of the matter: that "every thing which is not negatived [sic]
shall remain with Congress." 96 The inclusion of express reservation
in Article I, Section 9 "destroys [the Federalists'] doctrine." 97 Disbe-
lieving that the new national government's powers would remain lim-
ited, Henry argued that a bill of rights was absolutely necessary to
protect religious freedom.' 9
190 See infra note 201 (discussing how Patrick Henry was likely responsible for Virginia's pro-
posed religion amendment).
191 See, e.g., Patrick Henry, Statement at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 15, 1788),
reprinted in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 175, at 460, 461 (arguing
that the explicit reservations of power in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution implied that
"every thing which is not negatived [sic] shall remain with Congress").
192 Madison, Statement at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 175, at 330.
193 See Henry, Statement at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 191, at 461-62 (ar-
guing that the explicit reservations of power in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution implied
that those powers not expressly reserved were granted).
194 Id.
195 Id. at 461.
196 Id.
197 Id. On the same day, Governor Edmund Randolph offered the Federalist response to
Henry's criticism, namely that "every exception [Article 1, Section 9] mentioned is an excep-
tion, not from general powers, but from the particular powers therein vested." Randolph,
Statement at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 15, 1788), supra note 175, at 464.
198 See Henry, Statement at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 191, at 462 ("My
mind will not be quieted till [sic] I see something substantial come forth in the shape of a bill of
rights.").
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Henry and Virginia's Anti-Federalists sought, accordingly, to regu-
late how Congress would exercise power over religion. As mentioned
above, the Virginia Ratifying Convention proposed a modified ver-
sion of Section 16 of Article XVI of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.
The modifications, excluding punctuation, were as follows (with ad-
ditions in italics):
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence; and therefore all men arc cqually entitled have an
equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, accord-
ing to the dictates of conscience, and that it is thc mutl dt. y of all to
praetic. Christian forbearancc, lovc, and charity towards cach othcr no
particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established, by law, in pref-
erence to others.1'
The inclusion of the adjectives "natural" and "unalienable" empha-
sized the fundamental nature of the right to religious free exercise.
More significantly, Article XVI was rewritten to include the no-
preference provision that "no particular religious sect or society• • 
,,2001
ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference to others.
The introduction of the new concept of "no preference" suggests the
author's deliberate intention to regulate congressional power over
religion.251
III. THE DRAFTING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
When James Madison collected the various states' proposals for
amendments to begin work on what would become the Bill of Rights,
he must have noticed that a tension existed between New Hamp-
19 Virginia's proposed religion amendment can be found in the Virginia Ratifying Conven-
tion, supra note 179. The original text of Article XVI of the Virginia Declaration of Rights can
be found at THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 70.
200 Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 179, at 16.
201 It appears that Patrick Henry was responsible for these revisions. On June 24, 1788, the
day before the Virginia Convention voted in favor of ratification, Henry proposed a list of
amendments to the Constitution. At this point, Elliot records the following:
Here Mr. Henry informed the committee that he had a resolution prepared, to refer a
declaration of rights, with certain amendments to the most exceptionable parts of the
Constitution, to the other states in the confederacy, for their consideration, previous to
its ratification. The clerk than [sic] read the resolution, the declaration of rights, and
amendments, which were nearly the same as those ultimately proposed by the Conven-
tion ....
3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 175, at 593. Henry, of course, sup-
ported non-preferential aid to religion and did not believe that non-preferential establishments
violated an individual's liberty of conscience. In 1784, he had proposed the non-preferential
general assessment in Virginia, which was defeated by a Madison-led coalition. See supra text ac-
companying note 132. Given Henry's leadership in the Virginia Ratifying Convention and the
unmistakable parallel between the proposed amendment and his political record, all evidence
points to Henry's authorship of Virginia's proposed religion amendment.
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shire's and Virginia's proposed religion amendments. Whereas New
Hampshire aimed to limit federal power, Virginia's proposal might
be read to expand it. 0 2 Virginia's non-preferential language could be
interpreted to imply that Congress possessed authority to pass reli-
gious legislation if it did so in a non-preferential manner. Virginia's
Anti-Federalists, in their desire to control federal authority, proposed
an amendment that could be read to increase the very power that
they feared-the same power that New Hampshire's proposed
amendment sought to limit.
One can only imagine Madison's frustration with Patrick Henry in
particular and the Anti-Federalists in general. The important work of
establishing the new national government was being sidetracked to
address proposals like New Hampshire's, which Madison considered
unnecessary, and a proposal like Virginia's, which was inconsistent
203with many of the Anti-Federalists' self-professed position. Nonethe
less, Madison took charge of the amendment process in the First
Federal Congress. One of his reasons for doing so is easy to under-
stand. In the state ratifying conventions, Anti-Federalists exerted con-
siderable influence; even with the promise of amendments, Virginia
ratified the Constitution only by a vote of eighty-nine to seventy-
nine.204  If a second constitutional convention was called, Anti-
Federalists likely would play a significant role.20 5 Federalists, however,
controlled the First Federal Congress.0 6 If the drafting of amend-
ments stayed within Congress, they would shape the results. Propos-
ing amendments thus became Madison's focus in the first months of
the First Congress.2 0 7  Like almost all Federalists, he did not think
amendments were necessary to correct flaws in the Constitution, but
202 See supra notes 179-89 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between Vir-
ginia's no preference proposal and New Hampshire's federal amendment).
203 For Madison's original opposition to a bill of fights, see Madison, Statement at the Vir-
ginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 175. For a general discussion of how Madison came to
champion the Bill of Rights, see GOLDWIN, supra note 157, at 75-82.
204 VA. COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOV'T, supra note 156.
205 A second constitutional convention was a distinct possibility, and calls for one had started
even before the Philadelphia Convention finished its work. GOLDWiN, supra note 157, at 23-26.
During the Philadelphia Convention, Edmund Randolph repeatedly proposed a motion for a
second convention. Id. On May 5, 1789,just four weeks into the first session of the First Con-
gress, Theodore Bland, a congressman from Virginia, introduced a motion calling for a conven-
tion pursuant to Article V of the Constitution. Id. at 76. The next day, John Laurance of New
York presented an application from the New York legislature for a second constitutional con-
vention. Id. at 77.
206 See id. at 82 (identifying the Anti-Federalists as "the vocal minority" in the First House of
Representatives). According to Thornton Anderson, Anti-Federalists occupied only ten seats in
the House and two seats in the Senate in the First Federal Congress. See THORNTON ANDERSON,
CREATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CONVENTION OF 1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 176 (1993)
("Only Virginia sent Antifederalists to the Senate, and a mere ten were elected to the House.").
207 See GOLDWIN, supra note 157, at 80-82 (discussing Madison's strategy in changing his fo-
cus toward enacting a bill of rights).
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he did see them as essential to quell fears excited by the Anti-
Federalists.
20 s
On June 8, 1789, Madison proposed the following as one of his
amendments: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account
of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be estab-
lished, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any
manner, or on any pretext, infringed." Madison did not propose
language corresponding to his principle of "non-cognizance," which
he had set forth in his "Memorial and Remonstrance. '1 l Instead, he
proposed text that directly targeted Anti-Federalist arguments. He
specifically addressed the Anti-Federalists' concern over a uniform
national religion by prohibiting Congress from establishing one.
Madison included a statement extending blanket protection to the
rights of conscience and, moreover, he further specified that civil
rights would not be abridged on account of religion.
Madison, furthermore, rejected Virginia's no-preference ap-
proach, as can be seen by the omission in his text of anything like
Virginia's proposed no-preference provision.21 1 For the same reasons
Madison led the opposition against Henry's general assessment bill in
Virginia, he presumably would have objected to a non-preferential
legislation at the national level. Madison's proposed text, however,
most likely had nothing to do with prohibiting or allowing federal
non-preferential aid to religion as such. As he made clear in the Vir-
ginia ratifying convention, because the national government pos-
sessed only the powers delegated to it, Madison believed there was
"not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle
with religion. 2 12 The national government's "least interference" with
religion, he declared, "would be a most flagrant usurpation. 2 13 Since
Madison did not think Congress possessed power to aid religion as
such-whether in a non-preferential manner or not-he may have
208 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 113, at 1476-77 ("Like other proponents of the Constitu-
tion of 1787, Madison initially lacked enthusiasm for adding a Bill of Rights, though he came to
recognize the need for one to assuage the demands of the Antifederalist opposition.").
209 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
210 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 105 (2002) (noting that
Madison's proposed 1789 constitutional amendments were "a far cry from Madison's position in
1785 that religion was 'wholly exempt' from the cognizance of civil society"). Vincent Philip
Mufioz sets forth Madison's "non-cognizance" position in his article James Madison's Principle of
Religious Liberty, supra note 90. Mufioz defines Madison's role in drafting the First Amendment
at the First Federal Congress as influential, but restrained by the emphasis on compromise. Id.
at 25-27. For a competing interpretation that views Madison as the driving force behind the
drafting, see Irving Brant, Madison: On the Separation of Church and State, 8 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 14-
15 (1951).
211 See supra text accompanying notes 187-89 (discussing Virginia's proposed no-preference
amendment).
212 James Madison, Statement at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 175, at 330.
213 , 
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feared that no-preference text too easily could have been miscon-
strued to suggest that Congress possessed jurisdiction over religion.
We ought to remember that although Madison was a nationalist in
1789, he would not remain one for long.114 Whatever the reason,
Madison did not introduce for congressional consideration anything
like the no-preference text proposed by Virginia.
The House responded to Madison's proposal with irritation and
opposition.215 Most members did not want to be bothered with some-
thing they thought unnecessary and a waste of time.216 Sensing that
he would get nowhere with the full House, Madison managed to have
consideration of amendments moved to committee.1 7 In committee,
his original text was modified to state: "[N]o religion shall be estab-
lished by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed.
218
As described in the first section of this Article, the First Congress's
debate over the text of what would become the Establishment Clause
has received exhaustive academic and judicial scrutiny. The nature
of that debate, however, has been completely misperceived. The de-
bate was not between those who favored non-preferential aid on the
one hand and those who opposed any government aid on the other.
In fact, to use the term "debate" is something of a misnomer. The
records of the First Congress would be described more accurately as a
brief, Federalist-dominated discussion over how to phrase an
amendment that would not alter Congress's power yet would satisfy
the Constitution's critics.
After more pleading from Madison, the full House finally took up
consideration of amendments on August 15, 1789. The committee's
text met two immediate criticisms. Congressman Sylvester feared that
the text might be misconstrued so as "to abolish religion alto-
214 For a general discussion of the consistency and change in Madison's thought, see MARVIN
MEYERS, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OFJAMES MADISON
(1973).
215 See GOLDWIN, supra note 157, at 77-78 (summarizing the reaction to Madison's attempt to
introduce what would become the Bill of Rights as follows: "[Madison's] motion generated an
immediate storm of complaint and opposition. One member after another rose to object to
any delay of their important legislative business").
216 Samuel Livermore, for example, objected that "he could not say what amendments were
requisite, until the [new national] Government was organized." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 465 (Jo-
seph Gales ed., 1790). Roger Sherman claimed, "It seems to be the opinion of gentlemen gen-
erally, that this is not the time for entering upon the discussion of amendments: our only ques-
tion therefore is, how to get rid of the subject." Id. at 466. John Vining repeated the standard
Federalist argument "that a bill of rights was unnecessary in a Government deriving all its pow-
ers from the people." Id. at 467.
217 See GOLDWIN, supra note 157, at 79 ("Madison... brought this heated procedural contro-
versy to an abrupt end by simply ignoring it. He withdrew his motion to go into a committee of
the whole, moved instead that a select committee be appointed. ..
218 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
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gether. ' '21 9 Congressman Huntington, similarly, worried that it might
"be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion. 2 20 Roger Sherman, on
the other hand, "thought the amendment altogether unnecessary,
inasmuch as Congress had no authority whatever delegated to them
by the [C]onstitution to make religious establishments., 2 ' Madison's
response applied equally to both reservations. He is recorded as say-
ing that
he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not
establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor
compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.
Whether the words are necessary or not, he did not mean to say, but they
222
had been required by some of the State Conventions.
Madison made clear that the purpose of his amendment was to rec-
ognize restrictions on congressional power. He meant to assure Syl-
vester and Huntington that the amendment would not abolish state
establishments, which seems to have been their fear. Madison all but
conceded Sherman's point that, strictly speaking, the amendment is
unnecessary, but he reminded his Federalist colleagues that it had
been demanded along with ratification.2 3 Madison went on to sug-
gest that reinserting the word "national" before religion (as he had
originally proposed), would "point the amendment directly to the ob-
ject it was intended to prevent," namely that one or two sects might
gain pre-eminence "and establish a religion to which they would
compel others to conform.,
224
Regardless of Madison's specific intentions, at this point the First
Congress made a decisive turn away from his proposed language.
Samuel Livermore, who "did not wish them to dwell long on the sub-
ject," proposed New Hampshire's text: "Congress shall make no laws
touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience., 225 New
Hampshire's language more clearly acknowledged Congress's lack of
power to make a national establishment or to violate the rights of•226
conscience and to recognize state sovereignty over establishments.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 758.
22 Id. at 757.
2 Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
23 See GOLDWIN, supra note 157, at 40 (concluding that the promise to consider amendments
immediately after ratification "almost certainly saved the Constitution from ultimate defeat").
224 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758-59 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
225 Id. at 759. Livermore was instrumental in bringing about New Hampshire's ratification of
the Constitution.
226 According to Justice Souter, "Livermore's proposal would have forbidden laws having any-
thing to do with religion and was thus not only far broader than Madison's version, but broader
even than the scope of the Establishment Clause as we now understand it." Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 612-13 (1992) (Souter,J., concurring). Justice Souter seems not to have consid-
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After an Anti-Federalist rant by Elbridge Gerry, New Hampshire's text• • ,227
was immediately adopted on August 15, 1789.
Thereafter, no substantive discussion is found in the House re-
cords regarding the language that would become the Establishment
Clause. On August 20, 1789, the text was altered to read, "Congress
shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exer-
cise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience.,, 228 The replace-
ment of "establishing" for "touching" more clearly focused attention
on establishments, but why the House made the change is not illumi-
nated by the available record. Perhaps Congress was leery of "no laws
touching religion" because such language conceivably could have
been interpreted to reduce Congress's then-existing powers. Under
Livermore's language, if Congress, pursuant to its Article I powers,
passed a law that did not amount to an establishment but that
"touched religion"-for example, a law exempting conscientious reli-
gious objectors from federal military service-the law's constitutional-
ity conceivably could have been challenged. But whether any mem-
ber of Congress voiced such a concern is a matter of speculation.
More important to note is that the general structure of the text re-
mained unchanged. The House followed New Hampshire's federal
formulation, adopting text that recognized Congress's lack of power
over religious establishments. It never considered anything like Vir-
ginia's "no preference" proposal because Madison dismissed it from
the outset.
On September 3, 1789, the Senate began considering the lan-
guage approved by the House.2 9 Inferences about senators' inten-
tions must be drawn tentatively, because no record exists of their de-
bate. It appears that the Senate engaged in deliberation over how
extensively Congress's powers should be circumscribed. They imme-
diately rejected three narrow alterations that would have limited Con-
gress's power only to establish "one religious sect or society in prefer-
ence to others," "establishing any religious sect or society," or
"establishing any particular denomination of religion in preference
to another. 2 3 0  Each of these proposals was a version of Patrick
Henry's Virginia submission. Each could have been interpreted to
augment congressional power, implicitly allowing Congress to legis-
late on religious matters so long as it did so in a non-preferential
ered that federalism might relate to the original purpose of the Establishment Clause in general
or Livermore's proposal in particular.
227 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790) ("[T]he question was then taken on
Mr. Livermore's motion, and passed in the affirmative, thirty-one for, and twenty against it.").
228 Id. at 796.
I2 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 70
(Gales & Seaton 1820) (1789).
230 ,
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manner. In something of a reversal, on September 9, 1789, the Sen-
ate adopted language even narrower than that suggested by the Vir-
ginia Ratifying Convention: "Congress shall make no law establishing
articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise
of religion .... I,231 t sent this language back to the House. 2
When the House received the Senate's version, they called for a
joint committee to resolve the differences between the House and
Senate versions.2 33 Justice Souter, it will be recalled, bases his strict-
separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause in Lee v.
Weisman on that committee's rejection of the narrow Senate pro-
posal.2 4 But Souter misconceives the nature of the alternatives faced
by the joint committee. They did not, as he claims, face a choice be-
tween non-preferential language on the one hand and strict-
separationism on the other. Rather, the committee had before them
the two types of Anti-Federalist amendments that emerged from the
state ratifying conventions: the House-proposed, New Hampshire-
inspired federalism text and the Senate-proposed, Virginia-inspired
regulation language. Congress faced the choice between adopting
text that would recognize its lack of power (the House proposal) or
language that would regulate its power and thereby, arguably, aug-
ment it (the Senate proposal).
No record exists of the joint committee's deliberations, but the
outcome speaks for itself. The committee adopted language that was
unmistakably federal: "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
231 Id. at 77.
232 Despite recognizing that "in many of the debates in the preconstitutional period, the con-
cepts of 'liberty of conscience' and 'free exercise of religion' were used interchangeably," Mi-
chael McConnell claims that the First Congress's adoption of the latter over the former is "of
utmost importance." McConnell, supra note 113, at 1488-89. "Free exercise," he claims, ex-
tends the First Amendment's guarantees beyond "liberty of conscience" in three ways: (1) "free
exercise" protects religiously-motivated conduct (in addition to belief); (2) it encompasses the
corporate or institutional aspects of religious belief (in addition to individual judgment); and
(3) it singles out religion alone (as opposed to non-religious, deeply held convictions) for spe-
cial treatment. Id. at 1488-91. I believe that McConnell is mistaken to the extent that he as-
cribes such distinctions to the Framers of the First Amendment. From the Framers' contempo-
raneous uses of the terms, no evidence exists to distinguish "liberty of conscience" or "rights of
conscience" from "free exercise of religion." The joint committee most likely employed the
term "free exercise" instead of "liberty of conscience" or "rights of conscience" because the last
formulation adopted by the Senate employed this phrase.
233 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 939 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
234 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 614-15 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("The House
conferees [of the joint committee] ultimately won out, persuading the Senate to accept this as
the final text of the Religion Clauses: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion .... .' What is remarkable is that... [t]he Framers repeatedly considered and delib-
erately rejected... narrow language and instead expanded their prohibition to state support
for 'religion' in general.").
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thereof .. .,,23 The key to unlocking the meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause lies in understanding the words "respecting an,"236 which
were added by the joint committee. Then, as now, the present parti-
ciple "respecting" means "with reference to, [or] with regard to."
37
The added words reveal a precise intention-to indicate that Con-
gress lacked power with reference or regard to a religious establish-
ment. By adopting "respecting an," the joint committee drafted a so-
lution to the problem of how to craft language that would specify that
Congress lacked power to legislate a national establishment or to in-
terfere with existing state establishments (or lack thereof) without
implicitly granting to Congress power to pass church-state legislation
short of the stated prohibition.3  To restate the problem, if the
committee drew a specific line that Congress could not pass (as pro-
posed in the Senate), future congressional members might interpret
their power to include everything short of that line. "Respecting an"
offered a precise solution to this problem by indicating that Congress
lacked power in the entire realm of religious establishments. Unlike
the other First Amendment participles "prohibiting" and "abridging,"
which regulate but do not categorically deny Congress power, "re-
specting" indicates Congress's lack of jurisdictional authority over an
entire subject matter. The Establishment Clause thus made clear that
Congress lacked power to legislate a national establishment or to pass
legislation directly regarding state establishments (or the lack
thereof) 2 Of course, Federalists in the First Congress, such as Roger
Sherman, thought this was how the matter stood without an amend-
ment.240 With the addition of "respecting an," Congress found lan-
guage that did not affect the existing power of Congress (from the
235 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
236 Id.
237 2 NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2565 (4th ed. 1993).
238 Noah Feldman claims that "there is no evidence in the debates that the last-minute
change of language to 'respecting an establishment of religion' was intended to protect existing
state establishments." Feldman, supra note 15, at 407. Feldman does not comprehend, how-
ever, the political context that led to the Bill of Rights. Specifically, he fails to consider the
Anti-Federalist criticisms that led to the drafting of the Establishment Clause. He thus also fails
to understand why the drafters of the First Amendment sought to reaffirm the federal character
of the Constitution regarding religious establishments.
239 See, e.g., Porth & George, supra note 106, at 136-37 ("The obvious meaning of 'respecting
an' establishment of religion, then as now, is 'regarding,' or 'having to do with,' or 'in reference
to' such an establishment. And these words are broad enough to cover both a possible national
establishment and actual (and potential) state establishments. They call particular attention to
the constitutional disentitlement of the federal government to make any law setting up an es-
tablished church at the federal level or interfering with established churches (and the right of
the people to opt to establish churches) at the state level.").
240 See supra text accompanying note 221 (quoting Roger Sherman for the proposition that
the First Amendment was unnecessary as Congress could only act where the Constitution dele-
gated power).
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Federalists' viewpoint) yet would satisfy the fears aroused by Anti-
Federalist criticisms that the Constitution threatened religious free-
dom. It was a remarkable feat of constitutional craftsmanship.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE'S ORIGINAL
FEDERAL MEANING
A. The Impossibility of Incorporating the Establishment Clause's
Original Meaning
The Framers adopted the precise wording "respecting an estab-
lishment 2 4' to convey their intention of leaving the question of reli-
gious establishments to the states. With the Establishment Clause,
the First Congress did not adopt a principled understanding of the
proper relationship between church and state. It did not constitu-
tionalize a personal right of "non-establishment." The original mean-
ing of the Establishment Clause, in fact, is neutral toward religious es-
tablishments as it protects state establishments (or lack thereof) while
also acknowledging the lack of federal power over religion. When
the Everson Court interpreted the Establishment Clause to erect a
"wall of separation" between church and state, and applied that in-
terpretation against the states,242 it departed from the Founding Fa-
thers' original meaning.
The Everson Court necessarily had to discard the Establishment
Clause's original meaning to apply the provision against the states.
Because the original meaning only recognizes ajurisdictional bound-
ary that protects state authority, it cannot logically be incorporated to
apply against state governments. The doctrine of "incorporation" set
forth by Justice Benjamin Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut holds that
the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects those "fundamental" rights "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. 2 43 No shortage of debate exists over the
question of what rights are "fundamental" and "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty"; but for any provision of the Bill of Rights to
be eligible for incorporation, it must protect a personal right-some
241 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
242 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("Neither a state nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups .... IT]he clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall
of separation between church and State.'" (citation omitted)).
243 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). For a general overview of the concept of "incorporation," in-
cluding the various understandings of it, see HENRYJ. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM
AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 47-91 (7th ed. 1998).
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substantive right must exist that can be applied against the states.2 "
As adopted by the Framers, the Establishment Clause fails to meet
this criterion because it does not protect a personal right of "non-
establishment" or contain a substantive right to live under a govern-
ment with the "separation of church from state." In this way, the
Framers' Establishment Clause is different than the provisions of the
First Amendment that protect the personal rights of freedom of
speech and assembly. Like the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to
the states and to the people the powers not delegated to the federal
government, the Establishment Clause's original meaning pertains to
jurisdiction, and, therefore, cannot be applied against the states.
B. The Limited Relevance of the Founding Fathers for Incorporated
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
A construction of the Establishment Clause strictly faithful to its
original meaning would require disincorporation and the overturn-
ing of nearly sixty years of "no-establishment" jurisprudence. Follow-
ing the Framers' intentions, the Establishment Clause only would
prohibit the federal government from encroaching upon state au-
thority to legislate on matters of religion. States would be free to aid
or not to aid religion, subject only to their own constitutions and
other incorporated provisions of the federal Constitution, including
the First Amendment's free exercise and free speech protections.
Landmark cases that banned prayer in public schools, 2 4' disallowed
public funding of religious schools,246 and prohibited public religious• 247
displays (to take a few leading examples) could not be sustained asEstablishment Clause violations.2 48  A disincorporated Establishment
244 For a discussion of this point specifically in reference to the jurisdictional character of the
Establishment Clause, see SMITH, supra note 106, at 22-26.
245 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (holding that a state law mandat-
ing daily Bible reading in public schools violated the Establishment Clause).
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971) (striking down as unconstitutional
two state statutes that provided financial support of private school teachers' salaries and educa-
tion supplies for the instruction of certain secular subjects).
247 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601-02 (1989) (prohibiting the dis-
play of a creche during the holiday season in a county courthouse as violating the Establishment
Clause).
248 Even though Akhil Amar finds that the Establishment Clause is not incorporable, he con-
cludes that
it turns out that the question-should we incorporate the establishment clause?-may
not matter all that much, because even if we did not [incorporate the Establishment
Clause], principles of religious liberty and equality could be vindicated via the free exer-
cise clause (whose text, history, and logic make it a paradigmatic case for incorporation)
and the equal-protection clause (which frowns on state laws that unjustifiably single out
some folks for special privileges and relegate others to second class status.
AMAR, supra note 106, at 254. Amar assumes that the principles of religious liberty and equality
protected by the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses are the same as those articulated
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Clause would be jurisdictional, serving as a reminder that the federal
government is one of limited, delegated powers, and that direct legis-
lation on matters pertaining to religion is not one of those powers.
While disincorporation is logically possible, no sitting Supreme
Court Justice, except Clarence Thomas,249 has suggested that he or
she would entertain such a massive change in constitutional law. In-
corporation has long been accepted and the sheer force of time
would seem to ensure that the Establishment Clause will remain ap-
plicable against the states. The Supreme Court has failed to ac-
knowledge, however, that incorporation necessarily means that the
original meaning of the Establishment Clause cannot be applied to
modem cases. With incorporation, an "originalist" approach to the
Establishment Clause requires a partial or distorted recreation of his-
tory.
An "originalist" approach to an incorporated Establishment
Clause, in fact, should lead inquiry away from the Founding Fathers
and to the thoughts and intentions of those who drafted the Four-
teenth Amendment. If the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to apply the Establishment Clause against the states, then
their understanding of what principle they incorporated becomes au-
thoritative from an "originalist" perspective. Whether the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment did intend to incorporate any part of the
Bill of Rights is a matter of long-running dispute that exceeds the
scope of this Article.5 1 With regard specifically to the Establishment
by the modern Supreme Court under its incorporated no-establishment jurisprudence. His
breezy treatment of the matter, though, understates the significance of non-incorporability of
the Establishment Clause. Amar's conclusions should be compared to Andrew Koppelman's,
who discards as "unpersuasive" Amar's conclusion that the non-incorporability of the Estab-
lishment Clause would not have significant implications for "no-establishment" jurisprudence.
See Andrew Koppleman, Akhil Amar and the Establishment Clause, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 393, 402, 404
(1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 106) ("[I]fAmar's theory is accepted .... the present Es-
tablishment Clause constraints on the states must be abandoned.... A general problem with
originalism [or] textualist [theories] . .. is that it may produce prescriptions that radically dis-
rupt the status quo with no practical payoff other than greater fidelity to the theory. Amar's
theory, if taken as a complete theory of incorporation, would give no weight to the fact
that.., the law is well settled and nobody is particularly anxious to change it.").
249 See supra Part I.C for a discussion ofJustice Thomas's federalist interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause.
250 On the settled nature of incorporation in general, see, for example, Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 275 (1994), in whichJustice Scalia, in his concurrence, stated that incorporation is "an
extension I accept because it is both long established and narrowly limited," and ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 94 (1990), in which
Bork conceded that "as a matter ofjudicial practice the issue [of incorporation] is settled."
251 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 9-19
(1989) (discussing the "selective incorporation" of the Fourteenth Amendment and arguing
that it was intended to be narrow in scope); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 167-70 (1986) (analyzing the claim
that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to apply to the states and restrict
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Clause, however, little evidence exists to suggest that they clearly did
intend to apply a personal right of "non-establishment" against the
states. During the period surrounding the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the different congressmen who catalogued the
personal rights protected by the First Amendment (and thus arguably
by the Fourteenth Amendment) spoke only of "free exercise" or of
"freedom of conscience;" none spoke of a personal right of "non-
establishment."'52 So even if the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment understood the "privileges and immunities" of United States
citizenship (or "due process") to include the personal rights pro-
tected by the Bill of Rights, it is not clear that they identified "non-
establishment" as such a right.
253
The proposal and rejection of the Blaine Amendment in 1875,
moreover, further suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
understood to have incorporated the Establishment Clause. The
amendment, which passed in the House but failed to win approval in
the Senate, would have prohibited states from making any law "re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."2 4  Such language would have been redundant if the Four-
teenth Amendment had already applied the Establishment Clause
their action); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN.
L. REv. 5, 86-87 (1949) (citing the actions of New Hampshire in an effort to analyze whether
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights).
252 AMAR, supra note 106, at 253. Akhil Reed Amar provides the following endnote to sup-
port his statement that the congressmen spoke only of "free exercise" and "freedom of con-
science" and failed to discuss "nonestablishment":
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 198 app. (1860) (remarks of Rep. W.E. Simms);
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (remarks of Rep.James Wilson); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 105-58, 1072, 1629 (1866) (remarks of Rep.John Bingham,
Sen. James Nye, and Rep. Roswell Hart); CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 84-85 app.,
475 (1871) (citing the remarks of Reps. John Bingham and Henry Dawes); see also M.
CURTIS, supra note 9, at 135, 139-40 (quoting similar speeches outside of Congress by
Judge Lorenzo Sherwood and Judge Preston Davis); United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79,
81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282) (Woods, J.) (stressing speech, press, assembly, and
free exercise rights as Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities while omitting
mention of establishment clause).
Id. at 385 n.91; see also Lash, Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, supra note 106, at 1146-49 (ar-
guing that suggested amendments spoke of the friction between Catholic and Protestant relig-
ions rather than the issue of incorporation against the states).
253 But c.f Lash, Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, supra note 106, at 1088 (arguing that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did intend to incorporate the Establishment Clause
and meant for it to prohibit any government from either supporting or suppressing religion as
religion).
2 The text of the Blaine Amendment read in full:
No state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of
public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so
raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.
H.R. Res. 1, 44th Cong. (1875).
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against the states. The Blaine Amendment, furthermore, was de-
bated in Congress only seven years after the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Congress that debated it included twenty-
three members of the Congress that had approved the Fourteenth
Amendment (including Blaine himself), two members who had been
on the committee that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment,2 56 and
more than fifty members who had served in the legislatures of the
states that considered the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867 and
1868.257 This overlap suggests that, at a minimum, a significant por-
tion of those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
did not understand it to incorporate the Establishment Clause.
If the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to
apply the Establishment Clause against the states, then no legislative
intention or original meaning exists that an "originalist" approach
can adopt for incorporated "no-establishment" jurisprudence. Stated
differently, if it is impossible to deduce a non-jurisdictional principle
of "no-establishment" associated with either the original meaning of
255 The significance of the Blaine Amendment for the general debate over incorporation has
been exhaustively treated elsewhere. See CURTIS, supra note 251, at 169-70 (critiquing scholars'
claims that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment failed to intend for the amendment to
require the Bill of Rights to apply against the states); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis' Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 16-17 (1983) ("The Blaine
Amendment constitutes striking, contemporary testimony that the fourteenth amendment was
not considered to embrace the Bill of Rights."); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in
the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 464-65 (1981) (discussing how
the proposal of the Blaine Amendment served as the "clincher" in proving that the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend it to incorporate the Bill of Rights); Raoul Berger,
The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 311, 346-47 (1979) (claim-
ing that the Blaine Amendment served as proof that Justice Black's interpretation of incorpora-
tion was "not generally shared and w[as] untenable"); Michael Kent Curtis, Further Adventures of
the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89,
114-15 (1982) (arguing that the Blaine Amendment does not prove a consensus among the
Fourteenth Amendment Framers on the incorporation debate ); Lash, Rise of the Nonestablish-
ment Principle, supra note 106, at 1145-50 (arguing that the Blaine Amendment's rejection serves
as only weak evidence against incorporation, but rather that "it is questionable that the Blaine
Amendment had anything to do with the principles of nonestablishment or Free Exercise");
Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARv. L. REV. 939, 941 (1951)
(discussing the importance of the Blaine Amendment in discrediting the idea that the Four-
teenth Amendment was intended to incorporate religious provisions of the First Amendment);
F. William O'Brien, The Blaine Amendment 1875-1876, 41 U. DET. L.J. 137, 195-205 (1963) (pro-
viding an extensive analysis of the Blaine Amendment and its history); Note, Rethinking the In-
corporation of the Establishment Clause, supra note 106, at 1713 (stating that "[i]f the Fourteenth
Amendment had incorporated the Establishment Clause, the Blaine Amendment would have
been superfluous" and, therefore, its defeat "casts considerable doubt upon the proposition
that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to incorporate the Establishment Clause").
256 See Meyer, supra note 255, at 941 n. 14 (listing the members of the Congress).
257 See F. William O'Brien, The States and "No Establishment": Proposed Amendments to the Consti-
tution Since 1798, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 183, 208 n.105 (1965) (noting that many of the legislators
who had voted on the Blaine Amendment had also debated ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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the First Amendment or the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, an "originalist" approach to the incorporated Establishment
Clause becomes impossible.
Such a historical lacuna, ironically, could lead "no-establishment"
jurisprudence back to the Founding Fathers. Incorporation requires
the construction of a judicial principle of "no-establishment." Given
that the Founders were immersed in the task of Constitution writing
and that they extensively debated the proper relationship between
church and state, they might be considered a natural place to begin
the sustained reflection necessary to construct a sound constitutional
principle of church-state relations. A return to the Founders, how-
ever, could only begin-not end-deliberation. As discussed above,
leading Founders disagreed over the proper relationship between
church and state. Some founders, like George Washington and Pat-
rick Henry, defended non-sectarian support of religion of the sort
that was adopted in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.258 Other
founders, like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, railed against
state support of religion as such.259 So if the Founding Fathers are
consulted and a Washingtonian or Madisonian approach to church-
state questions is adopted, it would not and could not reflect the Es-
tablishment Clause's original meaning or the intentions of those who
adopted the text. Incorporation, accordingly, strips the Founders of
their special authorial status; with incorporation the original meaning
of the Establishment Clause cannot be adopted.
CONCLUSION
Justice William Brennan once criticized "originalism" as "little
more than arrogance cloaked as humility."260 While not directed at
Establishment Clause jurisprudence specifically, his criticism accu-
rately describes the Supreme Court's twentieth century "originalist"
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The precise and clear intention
and meaning of those who drafted the Establishment Clause has been
lost on the modem Supreme Court, which, with the recent exception
of Justice Thomas, has failed to appreciate the Founders' original
concern with federalism. 26 1 The modern Court's "originalist" failures
25 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 116, 119-21, 132 (discussing Washington's and Henry's
views that religion ought to receive government support).
259 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 136-48 (noting Jefferson's and Madison's efforts to end
state involvement in religion).
260 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, in
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION- THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 23, 25 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1990).
261 It should be noted that Justice Potter Stewart, in a short dissenting opinion that did not
attempt to elaborate fully the Establishment Clause's original meaning, also recognized the
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can be traced in part to the Justices' lack of attention to basic facts
from the history of the American founding. Aside from Justice Tho-
mas's Newdow concurrence, every significant "originalist" church-state
opinion has assumed that the Framers shared a uniform principle of
"no establishment" or "separation" and that they set forth this princi-
ple in the Establishment Clause.6 2 The Court has ignored the his-
torical context that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, which
has led it to overlook the Founders' concern with federalism.
Perhaps the most distressing implication of uncovering the Foun-
ders' concern with federalism is that it reveals the modern Supreme
Court's alarming misuse of history. In Everson, the Court assumed,
seemingly without consideration, that the Establishment Clause could
be incorporated to apply against the states.2 6 ' Nothing in that case
indicates that Justices Black or Rutledge paused to consider that the
framers of the First Amendment might have been primarily con-
cerned with federalism.2 6 The unreflective manner by which the
Everson Court incorporated the Establishment Clause is illustrated by
Justice Black's deficient historical analysis.265 He mistakenly asserted
that Jefferson played a leading role in the drafting and adoption of
Framers' concern with federalism: "[T]he Establishment Clause was primarily an attempt to
insure that Congress not only would be powerless to establish a national church, but would also
be unable to interfere with existing state establishments." Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
309-10 (1963) (StewartJ., dissenting).
262 See supra Part I.
263 See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 106, at 481 ("As a matter of judicial craftsmanship, it is
striking in retrospect to observe how little intellectual curiosity the members of the Court dem-
onstrated in the challenge presented by the task of adapting, for application to the states, lan-
guage that had long served to protect the states against the federal government.").
2rA See Esbeck, supra note 104, at 1576 ("Scholars delight in pointing out this [federalism]
purpose, for it is an embarrassment to the U.S. Supreme Court, which completely overlooked
this federalism feature in deciding Everson v. Board of Education. The no-establishment restraint
was said by the Everson Court to be applicable to state and local governments under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a complete inversion of this first purpose of the
Establishment Clause."); Glendon & Yanes, supra note 106, at 491-92 ("With hindsight, incor-
poration in the 1940s posed formidable legal-political challenges that should have called forth
every ounce of energy, wit, technical skill, and legal imagination available to the Court. Yet it is
hard to escape the impression in reading the decisions of that era that-regardless of out-
comes-serious issues were overlooked, important claims and arguments were rather lightly
dismissed, and practical implications for the lives of countless Americans were regularly ig-
nored. The Court skipped carelessly over formidable problems of interpretation that required
sustained attention to the language, history, and purposes of the original Constitution, the Bill
of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the relation among them in the modern regulatory
state.").
26 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 106, at 5 (referring to the Court's "dismal historical perform-
ance" in Everson). According to Hugo Black's biographer, Justice Black did not peruse the pro-
ceedings of the First Congress until "[a]fter Everson was decided." ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO
BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 365 (1994).
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the Fist - " 266the First Amendment. He failed, moreover, to provide any evi-
dence for the linchpin of his opinion-that the First Federal Con-
gress intended to provide the same protection of religious liberty as
Jefferson's Virginia Statute.267 Justice Rutledge compounded Justice
Black's errors by his interpretation of "respecting an." He missed the
federal meaning of the phrase, interpreting it instead to mean that
"not simply an established church, but any law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion is forbidden. 68  Justice Rutledge thus trans-
formed a statement of federalism into an expansive principle of sepa-
ration.
On the contemporary Court, Justice Souter has accepted Everson's
incorporation framework, and, to that extent, his Establishment
Clause opinions suffer from the same fatal misconceptions as Justices
Black's and Rutledge's. To his credit, Justice Souter has made a seri-
ous attempt to ground his interpretations in the historical record, but
he has approached that record in light of the late twentieth-century
"strict-separationist"/"non-preferentialist" paradigm. As such, he dis-
torts the Framers' intentions, fitting their positions into modern-day
jurisprudential categories with which the First Congress was ulti-
mately unconcerned. Perhaps because he has become aware of the
problems with his earlier historical claims, Justice Souter in the 2005
Ten Commandments case, McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil
Liberties Union of Kentucky, depicted his "neutrality" interpretation of
the Establishment Clause as only reflecting "[a] sense of the past,"
not as capturing the text's original meaning simply.
69
Like Justice Souter, Justice Rehnquist never reconsidered Everson's
primary assumption that the Establishment Clause contains within it a
principle of "no establishment." Thus, he too failed to set forth an
interpretation that accurately reflects the Founders' federal inten-
tions. Justice Thomas alone has approached the Establishment
Clause with historical accuracy, although he has not offered an ade-
2 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (noting that "Jefferson played [a] lead-
ing role[]" in the drafting and adoption of the First Amendment).
267 Justice Black applied, furthermore, an interpretation of Jefferson's "wall of separation"
metaphor that has been undermined by recent historical scholarship. See, e.g., DREISBACH, su-
pra note 106, at 56 (arguing that the "wall" was intended to create two distinct separations: one
between the federal government and religious institutions, and another between federal and
state governments on matters concerning religion and thereby preventing federal influence on
religious practices endorsed by state governments); Daniel Dreisbach, Another Look at Jefferson's
Wall of Separation: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the "Wall" Metaphor (2000), available at
http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=WTO0G4 ("Jefferson's 'wall' was a metaphoric construction of
the First Amendment, which governed relations between religion and the national government.
His 'wall,' therefore, did not specifically address relations between religion and state authori-
ties.").
26 Everson, 330 U.S. at 31 (RutledgeJ., dissenting).
269 McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2742 (2005).
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quate account as to why the Framers were concerned with federalism.
Justice Thomas's Newdow opinion, moreover, fails to address the
sweeping implications of what a return to the Founders' intentions
would require for Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
A jurisprudence that seeks to return to the original meaning of
the Establishment Clause requires the disincorporation of the provi-
sion. Barring this, the Founding Fathers cannot be cited authorita-
tively for an "originalist" approach to the First Amendment's Estab-
lishment Clause.
